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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) has played a vital role in the creation of the globalized 
world known today. Through the many challenges and setbacks the union has 
experienced the past decades it has demonstrated how unification and cooperation has 
become increasingly important. This study argues how in this process of globalized 
consolidation solidarity plays a vital role. Communities such as the EU rely to a large 
extent on all its member states involved willing to be solidary. The aim of this study 
has been to find justification for demonstrating solidarity during the refugee crisis of 
2015/2016. This has been done by examining Dutch media and interviewing Dutch 
government officials. Upon examination of the sources, it became clear that the 
failures of the most important EU asylum regulations were due to a lack of solidarity. 
The theory of intergovernmentalism demonstrated how states preferred applying their 
own national regulations instead of following the supra-national EU policies. By 
applying the theories of instrumental and normative solidarity this study was able to 
grasp an idea of what is vital to improve in order to increase solidarity in the union. 
Focusing on the self-interest of the member states within the union is vital in order to 
stimulate solidarity. The member state should be well informed of why it is beneficial 
to be part of the EU. In addition, the union should focus on further developing a 
European identity among its residents in order to improve the feeling of solidary.  
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Introduction 
 
  During the recent decade the EU experienced challenging years. As Grimmel 
and My Giang state, “never before in its history has the EU been confronted with so 
many conflict-laden challenges – persistent financial turmoil, migration, the rise of 
nationalist parties, separatist movements and terrorists threats” (2017, p. 1). One of 
the major setbacks the EU had to face was the refugee crisis of 2015/2016. The 
restless situations in North Africa and the horrific events of the Arab Spring resulted 
in millions of people fleeing and seeking asylum elsewhere (Langford, 2013, p.217). 
Europe was experiencing a severe rise in asylum applicants, with most refugees 
coming from Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria (Langford, 2013, p. 217). Having once 
arrived at the borders of Europe, many refugees found that their hopes for a better life 
would soon fall apart (Langford, 2013, p. 217). A deficient asylum regime system, a 
disintegrating union and the lack of solidarity among many member states resulted in 
the severe crisis we know of today (Langford, 2013, p. 217). The member states 
within the EU were unprepared for such a high influx of asylum seekers. The different 
EU institutions were lacking proper instruments and regulations in order to manage 
the crisis in a sufficient way. This created unrest in the union and resulted in fear for a 
further disintegrating EU. The role of solidarity within the process of integration has 
been of great interest to many academics. As both Grimmel and My Giang (2017) and 
Langford mention (2013), solidarity is a crucial concept that keeps the European 
Union united. Without solidarity, no community would be able to cooperate and 
provide the aid needed for its fellow members. Nevertheless, the literature available   
that discusses solidarity in relation to the EU’s asylum and migration policies and 
regulations remains limited. This thesis will attempt to contribute by demonstrating 
the need of solidarity in the EU’s immigration and asylum policies and the lack of 
solidarity that was found during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016. The research focused 
on finding justification for demonstrating solidarity in relation to the EU asylum and 
migration policies by analyzing Dutch news media and interviews conducted with 
Dutch government officials. These government officials were active working for the 
Dutch government during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016. This resulted in the 
following research question; how do the Dutch newspapers and Dutch government 
officials justify the need for solidarity provided by the EU’s member states during the 
refugee crisis of 2015/2016? The main theory applied is the theory of solidarity. The 
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focus will be on two different directions, namely normative and instrumental 
solidarity. This is done in order to better understand the justification found for 
solidarity. In addition, two theories will be applied which will give better insight into 
the integration process of the EU, namely the theory of supra-nationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Overall, the theories will attempt to demonstrate the need for 
solidarity in correlation to the EU asylum and migration regulations and the 
importance of an integrated Union.  
 The research conducted is based on Dutch primary sources and therefore 
demonstrates a Dutch perspective. The Netherlands was used as a case study since the 
state can be seen as a plausible case for solidarity. As George and Bennett explain, a 
plausible case is a caste study that can be used as a broader phenomenon due to its 
desired properties and characteristics (2005). The Netherlands is a member of the EU 
and is considered a wealthy European state. It has benefitted majorly from EU 
integration and is considered a state that is willing to respect all regulations made (den 
Boer, 2013). Therefore, analyzing solidarity in the Netherlands should be a valid 
representation of the expected solidarity one would find within the union in general. 
When analyzing the results gained during the research process, three different themes 
came across. This resulted in three sections, namely the failure of the Dublin 
regulation, the failure of the Schengen zone and the need of the EU-Turkey deal. The 
following section discusses the findings and creates an analysis of the results in 
relation with the theories used. It provides information on how the Dutch government 
officials and newspapers justify the need for solidarity. The conclusion will provide 
us with a summary of the main results found and will give us an answer to the 
research question.  
 
Theoretical framework 
 
 In order to be able to answer the research question, this thesis will analyze the 
results through one main theoretical framework, namely solidarity. First of all, the 
history and evaluation of the concept solidarity will be discussed. Stjernø describes 
three different traditions of solidarity, namely solidarity from a classical social 
perspective, solidarity from a political perspective and solidarity from a religious 
perspective (2005). He uses these different approaches to demonstrate how solidarity 
was created and what different impacts it had on society throughout history (2005). 
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Stjernø argues that the main idea of solidarity is described as the process of belonging 
to a certain group (2005). This feeling of group loyalty and sharing resources however 
long existed before the concept of solidarity was developed (Stjernø, 2005, p. 25). 
Due to the fact that humans share a common identity with family members, a feeling 
of belonging to a group was automatically gained. Solidarity can therefore be found 
for as long as human kind exists.  
 From a classical social theory perspective, the recognition and creation of the 
concept of solidarity was first found during the early days of the Christian era, where 
close relationships with family and development between different communities were 
created (Stjernø, 2005, p. 25). As Stjernø explains, many classical social theorists 
such as Fourier, Leroux and Comte mainly focused on how certain groups became 
united and what it was that united them (2005, p. 25). They believed that a 
community is stronger than an individual and that religious lifestyles and family 
bonds create unification (Stjernø, 2005, p. 25). Solidarity as a political discourse 
emerged during the French Revolution (2005, p. 42). During this revolution, the 
concept of brotherhood and fraternity became even more relevant (Stjernø, 2005, p. 
39). During this period of time, individuals united in order to fight for their political 
rights. In addition, the political social discourse argues that belonging to a community 
brings benefits for all individuals involved. In order to gain economic and political 
benefits, collaboration with all members within a certain society or community is 
vital. Throughout the years, political social discourse evolved due to the rise of 
capitalism and globalization. As Prainsack and Buyx explain, the rise of capitalism 
led to a shift in certain social roles and relationships between individuals (2017). Due 
to a change in production, a need of new social regulations and of mutual alliance was 
created (Prainsack & Buyx, 2017). A hierarchy existed that demonstrated the roles 
each individual had in this capitalistic society. As Sterjnø argues, “the development of 
industrial capitalism destroyed social bonds and older forms of community where 
people were firmly integrated in local and social structures” (2005, p. 43). 
Nevertheless, according to the modern political perspective, the individual is aware of 
the different roles and accepts that a hierarchy is needed in order for the modern 
capitalistic society to function properly. Stjernø argues that the modern political 
perspective entails all interests of the different classes in a society and demonstrates 
acceptance towards all these different classes (2005). According to the political 
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perspective, solidarity includes individuals willing to help their fellow members gain 
the rights they are entitled to.  
 From a religious perspective, the catholic and protestant ideas of solidarity are 
founded upon the belief that man is created in the image of God and that each and 
every human being is equal in the eyes of God (Stjernø, 2005, p. 88). The history of 
the concept demonstrates how solidarity is mainly built upon the feeling of belonging 
to a community, whether this is family or a broader societal group within society. 
This can be applied to the EU since the different member states within the Union all 
belong to the same community. One would therefore expect that being part of the 
same Union unites them and makes them feel interconnected on different levels. 
Solidarity should therefore, according to the history described above, be found on a 
large scale within the Union. The question however still remains what motivates an 
individual or community to demonstrate solidarity. There are two main theories of 
solidarity that have been discussed by many academics, namely normative solidarity 
and instrumental solidarity (Widegren, 1997; Ellison, 2012; Steinvorth, 2017). These 
will give further insight to what motivates an individual to demonstrate solidarity. 
 
Normative solidarity  
  
 The normative approach is mostly used in a social context, meaning that it 
focuses on solidarity found in relation to social interactions. It is therefore referred to 
by academics as social solidarity (Widegren, 1997). According to Widegren, social 
solidarity has a certain degree of warmth (1997). He argues that an individual acts 
towards meeting the needs of the other person rather than meeting its own needs 
(1997). One of the main commendations found is the fact that normative solidarity is 
demonstrated and conducted by individuals who do not rely on “the expectation of 
reciprocal generosity” (Arnsperger & Varoufakis, 2003, p. 171). Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis explain how normative solidarity includes individuals offering aid towards 
fellow members within their community without expecting any favor in return (2003). 
Therefore, normative solidarity gives us the opportunity to demonstrate the better part 
of ourselves (Arnsperger &Varoufakis, 2003, p. 171). Thus, according to some 
academics demonstrating solidarity can be seen as an act that is morally correct 
(Ellison, 2012, p. 23). They claim that demonstrating solidarity is simply the right 
thing to do. According to Hechter, normativists argue that some groups are more 
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solidary than others (1987). This is due to the fact that certain groups have more 
extensive norms and values, which facilitates demonstrating solidarity for the 
individuals involved (Hechter, 1987, p. 8). Komter and de Witte agree with this and 
argue that social solidarity will be stronger when individuals within a community 
share a strong identity based upon shared norms and values (2004; 2015). The 
cohesiveness within a community and the feeling of mutual attraction is vital 
(Komter, 2004, p. 115). De Witte adds to this by explain how normative solidarity 
portrays a strong idea of membership (2015, p. 11). States should include normative 
solidarity by creating national systems of social sharing for all citizens (2015, p. 11).   
Normative solidarity will be applied in our research in order to explain how the 
member states of the EU share a common feeling of identity. In addition to this, the 
EU provides its member states with a feeling that it is morally expected to help each 
other, especially in times of crises. By being part of the Union, the member states 
were expected to demonstrate solidarity towards their fellow member states and help 
the member states that were affected most by the refugee crisis. Therefore, the social, 
or normative solidarity, expects having a common identity will lead to the 
demonstration of more solidarity. 
 
Instrumental solidarity 
  
 Instrumental solidarity is mostly seen in a political context. According to 
Widegren, instrumental solidarity comes in the form of a contract or agreement that 
discusses the benefits both parties gain when demonstrating solidarity (1997). 
According to Ellison, the instrumental approach stresses common interest as the 
reason for solidarity (2012, p. 23). Rather than demonstrating solidarity for moral 
reasons, it is mainly done for the benefits of oneself. Steinvorth claims that 
instrumental solidarity can only be found when the individuals involved have similar 
goals and are on the same legal level (2017, p. 10). Hechter agrees with this and 
explains how instrumental solidarity is demonstrated not because of the shared norms, 
but because of the shared interests (1987, p. 9). De Witte argues that states should 
provide access towards the instruments that provide instrumental solidarity, such as 
the labor market, public goods and welfare benefits, and should stimulate its citizens 
to engage (2015, p. 11). This thesis will apply the theory of instrumental solidarity in 
order to demonstrate how the propensity of demonstrating solidarity will be higher 
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when the member states involved have a higher self-interest in being part of the EU 
community. The states know the EU provides the individual member states with 
benefits they would not gain when remaining independent. Instrumental solidarity 
also explains how the different agreements and regulations made by the EU forces the 
member states to follow certain demands. The states know they will lose trust and 
confidence from their fellow member states when not obeying forced regulations. 
This may even lead to severe consequences, such as fines or other economic 
unfavorable arrangements. Therefore, demonstrating solidarity according to the 
instrumental solidarity theory provides both the individual and the community with 
benefits. Solidarity will increase when both parties are informed of these profits.  
 
Intergovernmentalism vs. supra-nationalism    
 
 In order to better understand the integration process of the EU, two main 
theories will be used, namely intergovernmentalism and supra-nationalism. According 
to Moravschik, intergovernmentalism stresses that states remain the main actors in 
every policy-making situation (1998). The interests of each state shape all 
negotiations that are held and they all wish to maintain their independence 
(Moravscik, 1998). As Hix explains, the main aim of the governments of states “is to 
protect their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty” (2005, 
p. 15). Supra-nationalism, on the other hand, stresses the importance of supranational 
institutions in governance and policy-making (Haas, 1958). According to this theory, 
the increasing globalized world has resulted in nations having lost a part of their 
sovereignty to certain supranational institutions (Haas, 1958). As Hix explains, supra-
nationalism assumes that “the member-state governments are not in full control, and 
that supranational institutions exert a significant independent influence on 
institutional and policy outcomes” (2005, p. 16). Moravscsik claims that these 
supranational institutions are needed in order to guarantee efficient cooperation 
between the different member states (1998). In contrast to intergovernmentalism, 
supra-nationalism believes that states are willing to give up a part of their sovereignty 
towards supranational institutions. These institutions will help states collaborate and 
provide the most sufficient policy-making process. In relation to solidarity, one could 
state that a state will apply an intergovernmental approach when not willing to be 
solidary. In contrast, a state will apply a supra-national approach when willing to be 
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more solidary. These two theories will help understand what happens in the EU when 
solidarity is not found and what influence it has towards the further integration 
process. Overall, it will help clarify why it is vital to demonstrate solidarity in a 
community such as the EU.  
 
Methodology  
 
 The main focus of this thesis was to conduct research based on Dutch primary 
sources. First of all, three suitable candidates were found who were all working for 
the Dutch government at the Ministry of Justice and Security during the period of 
January 2016 till June 2016. Nevertheless, each government official was working at a 
different department within this ministry. The first interview was held with Rhodia 
Maas. She worked as the General Director of the Repatriation and Departure Service 
at the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security. The following interview was held with 
Bart-Jan ter Heerdt. He worked as the Department Head of Asylum, Reception and 
Return of the Migration Policy Directorate at the Dutch Ministry of Justice and 
Security. The last interview was held with Peter Diez. He worked as the Deputy 
Director of the Migration Policy Department at the Dutch Ministry of Justice and 
Security. The interviews consisted of five questions and were used as a qualitative 
research approach. The aim was to gain more insight in the way the Dutch 
government approached the refugee crisis. A transcript has been made of the 
interviews held and has been added as an appendix to this thesis. Next to the 
interviews, a quantitative research method was applied. The focus was put on five 
newspapers that belong to the list of most read newspapers in the Netherlands 
(“Nederlandse Kranten”, 2018). These newspapers were: De Volkskrant, Het 
Algemeen Dagblad (AD), Het NRC Handelsblad, Trouw and Het Parool. An analysis 
was made of the different newspaper articles that discussed the refugee crisis. The 
time frame chosen was the 1st of January 2016 till the 30th of June 2016. This period 
was chosen since the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte practiced the function of 
presidency in the European Union between these exact dates (Pieters, 2016). 
Therefore, a large amount of articles were available that discussed his presidency in 
the EU and the Dutch approach towards the refugee crisis. In order to narrow down 
the articles available and focus only on the ones that were of relevance for the 
research, two different key words were used, namely ‘refugee crisis’ and ‘EU’. This 
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resulted in 151 articles in total. The articles were then analyzed and divided into four 
different categories. The first two categories focused on whether the articles provided 
a positive or negative connotation regarding the solidarity found in the EU. The 
following two categories divided the articles according to whether they were 
discussing normative or instrumental solidarity. In order to provide a visual picture of 
the findings, a chart was created in which all results were gathered and organized. 
This chart has been included in the results section. A clarification should be made that 
this research conducted does not provide enough information and proof to illustrate a 
valid representation of the solidarity found in the whole of the European Union. The 
research conducted is based on the Dutch government and media and is therefore 
from a Dutch perspective.  
 
Literature Review  
 
 As has been stated before, integration within the EU has been a topic of 
interest to many academics. Existing literature has covered the concept of solidarity in 
relation to integration and has discussed its role during this process. In addition, 
academics have discussed the refuge crisis of 2015/2016 and have attempted to seek 
explanations as to why it resulted in such a severe catastrophe. Many academics have 
argued how the crisis resulted in further disintegration within the union. The literature 
available that discusses the concept of solidarity in relation to EU’s asylum policies 
and regulations however remains limited. Therefore, this thesis would like to 
contribute to the literature by discussing and demonstrating the relevance of solidarity 
in EU’s asylum policies, especially during periods of crises. Below, this thesis will 
elaborate on the existing literature that discusses both the integration process within 
the EU and the role solidarity plays in this. Furthermore, this thesis will elaborate on 
the existing literature that covers the refugee crisis. Lastly, this thesis will highlight 
the existing gap and will demonstrate the relevance of the research conducted. 
 
The EU - supra-national or intergovernmental?  
  
 First of all, as has been stated before, there is an existing debate in the 
literature that has overruled all other debates covering the EU. This debate discusses 
whether the EU has experienced further integration during the recent decade. When 
	   	   	  	  	  Jansen	  van	  Rosendaal	  s1402900	  
	   12	  
studying literature that dates from before the crisis of 2015/2016, one notices that 
academics seem to claim that the EU overall has undergone a period of 
Europeanisation (Tholen, 2004, Guild, 2006, Medrano, 2008, Comte, 2010). The 
different member states have given more power to the EU institutions such as the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, 
and have aimed for a more supranational approach (Kaunert, Léonard & Universitait 
Pompeu Fabra, 2011). European states developed special relations and preferred 
cooperating in order to deal with certain issues, such as migration (Tholen, 2004, p. 
347). When studying more recent literature dating from after the refugee crisis, one 
notices that the supra-nationalistic approach of the EU has been criticized (Niemann 
& Zaun 2018; Thieleman, 2018). Academics seem to blame the supra-nationalistic 
EU institutions for lacking supervision characteristics. Niemann and Zaun argue how, 
even though the EU has co-operated the past 18 years on asylum policies, the lack of 
a concentrated approach in times of crisis is puzzling and makes us question the state 
of integration in the EU policy field (2018, p. 13). They claim that there was a poor 
internal response to the crisis and for many member states the refugee crisis was not 
seen as an important priority (2018, p. 13). The failure of equal burden sharing and 
the failure of the open border regulations within the EU demonstrate how the states 
preferred to follow their own national regulations (Zaun, 2018). Zaun argues how the 
supra-nationalism approach seemed to be lost and claims that the EU member states 
preferred to apply a liberal intergovernmentalism approach (2018, p. 57). There are 
however also academics who do not agree with the decrease of supra-nationalism 
during the crisis. Niemann and Speyer for example claim that a neofunctionalist 
approach is best to explain the measures adopted by the EU since the outbreak of the 
so-called refugee crisis (2018, p. 23). According to them there is a decline in the role 
of the nation state and the ideology of nationalism (2018). It is the smaller groups of 
individuals who will gain power and eventually rise and gain power in the 
supranational governance of the EU (2018). Nevertheless, the majority of the 
academic articles have criticized the integration process of the EU. Dagi argues how 
the refugee crisis of 2015/2016 has stimulated “the strength of the advocates of 
national sovereignty within the Member States of the EU” (Dagi, 2018, p. 15). Supra-
nationalism is still a nascent idea and intergovernmentalism is the only approach to 
help member states escape situations such as the refugee crisis (Dagi, 2018, p. 15).  
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EU integration: solidarity as a crucial condition 
  
 Many academics claim that solidarity has acquired an increasing prominent 
place in European policy during the recent years (Ellison, 2012; Thym & Tsourdi, 
2017; Sangiovanni, 2013). As Ellison explains, there is a growing number of “policies 
that are designed to stimulate transnational solidarity” (2012, p. 8). Many academics 
have studied the concept of solidarity in the EU and have argued that it plays a vital 
role in the process of integration (Sangiovanni, 2013; Langford, 2013; Withol de 
Wenden; 2017 & Baubock, 2018). Solidarity is crucial in order for integration to 
occur and remain within the EU. Sangiovanni argues that a full account of EU 
solidarity must consist out of three main contexts, namely principles of national 
solidarity, principles of member state solidarity and principles of transnational 
solidarity (2013). By pooling these three different contexts, “European citizens agree 
to share one another’s fates, to preserve their commitments to domestic solidarity, and 
to give each other the fair return expressed by the internationalist ideal” (Sangiovanni, 
2013, p. 241). However, by way of contrast, solidarity and its role in the ongoing 
crisis in the EU’s immigration, asylum and border control policies has so far gained 
relatively little attention in academic debates (Ross, 2010; Thym &Tsourdi, 2017, p. 
606). The existing literature that discusses solidarity in relation to the asylum 
regulations in the EU has therefore been limited.  
 Several academics have discussed the deficiencies that occurred during the 
refugee crisis of 2015/2016 and have attempted to explain why the crisis became so 
severe. Bauböck discusses how an incomplete harmonization of norms regarding 
reception and determination of asylum across member states created agitation in the 
Union (2018). In addition, this initiated an obstacle for the establishment of a 
European identity across all member states (Bauböck, 2018). Hathaway and Neve 
predicted how solidarity plays a vital role in relation to the asylum regulations of the 
EU (1997). They explain how each member state has a different capacity to take in a 
certain amount of refugees (1997, p. 211). Some member states will be better at 
providing physical protection, while others will be more suitable at providing 
financial support by offering them certain resources (Hathaway & Neve, 1997, p. 
211). Hence, for member states to be able to maximize their solidarity, it is vital to 
focus on their capacities and strengths (Hathaway & Neve, 1997, p. 211). Withol de 
Wenden discussed how the rise of nationalist ideologies in different European states 
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created limitations to the integration found within the EU (2017). He explains how the 
desire to restore national borders demonstrated this (2017, p. 74). According to him, 
this had a negative impact on resolving the crisis and only limited the EU capacities to 
appease the situation (2017).  In addition to this, Lahusen and Grasso argue how the 
EU has experienced an increase of extreme rightist parties in many member states 
during recent years (2018, p. 2). According to them this raises further concerns 
regarding European solidarity (2018, p. 2). The rise of xenophobic and Eurosceptic 
protests across Europe are examples of how the refugee crisis had a negative impact 
on the social cohesion within the union (Lahusen & Grasso, 2018, p. 2). Grimmel and 
My Giang claim how the current crisis situation reveals that solidarity within the EU 
is not lost, however it is rather weak and rarely practiced (2017). They argue that the 
EU contains the correct norms and values, nonetheless fails to practice them (2017). 
As has been noted, the literature available that discusses solidarity in correlation to 
EU’s asylum policies remains limited. Therefore this thesis would like to contribute 
and demonstrate the vital role solidarity plays in these regulations. In addition, it 
wants to demonstrate the importance of cooperation between individuals in times of 
crises. More concrete, this paper will demonstrate the important role solidarity plays 
during crisis such as the one of 2015/2016. It will further on elaborate how the lack of 
solidarity during the crisis of 2015/2016 created deficiencies within the union and 
resulted in further disintegration.  
 
Results 
 
 Fist of all, the quantitative research conducted demonstrates us that the 
majority of the Dutch newspaper articles argued that there was a lack of instrumental 
solidarity during the refugee crisis. The chart below indicates how 92 out of the 151 
articles described a negative instrumental solidarity connotation. Furthermore, 35 
articles described a negative normative solidarity connotation. Overall, only a 
minority of the articles described a positive solidarity connotation. Therefore, one can 
conclude that according to the Dutch media there was a lack of instrumental solidarity 
found in the EU during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016. Furthermore, the qualitative 
research results gained via the interviews were brought together with the quantitative 
research results. The responds of the interviewees were compared with the content of 
the newspaper articles. This was done in order to grasp a better overall understanding 
	   	   	  	  	  Jansen	  van	  Rosendaal	  s1402900	  
	   15	  
of the solidarity found within the EU. Three themes came across regularly and were 
discussed thoroughly by both the newspaper articles and the interviewees. These were 
the failure of the Dublin regulation, the failure of the Schengen zone and the need for 
a EU-Turkey agreement. The following section will discuss the findings and will 
provide an explanation of the different regulations, the reasons they failed and what 
should be improved in the future according to the newspaper articles and 
interviewees. Further on, during the analysis, the thesis will discuss the correlation 
between the results and the theories and will demonstrate how solidarity is justified.  
 
Solidarity in the EU according to Dutch newspapers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The failure of the Dublin regulation 
 
  A topic that came across regularly in the articles and during the interviews 
held was the failure of the Dublin regulation.  
 
What is the Dublin regulation?  
  
 During the creation of the European Union in 1945, immigration and asylum 
were matters that were left to the member states themselves (Fullerton, 2016, p. 64). 
The states contained the power to decide on what terms who they would allow to 
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enter their territory. However, by 1999 the Union had doubled in size and was dealing 
with large asylum issues (Fullerton, 2016, p. 64). The wars in the eastern part of 
Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union forced many to flee their countries and seek 
asylum in other Western European states (Fullerton, 2016, p. 64). The inconsistent 
response by the various member sates to this incoming refugee flow demonstrated the 
inefficiency and complexity of the asylum system the EU was working with 
(Fullerton, 2016, p. 65). Having twenty-five different asylum laws led to the necessity 
of creating one Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Fullerton, 2016, p. 65). 
Since the start of the CEAS, complex political negotiations have been held in order to 
create an asylum regime that would be applicable throughout the whole of the EU 
(Fullerton, 2016, p. 65). During the first phase of the CEAS, between the years 2000 
and 2005, many rules were created in order to deliver the different member states 
certain guidelines they could follow during the asylum process. As Fullerton explains, 
these rules include which member state should take in particular claims, the care of 
the asylum seekers during the process and the procedural rules for asylum decisions 
(2016, p. 65). These different components then later on became law via different 
regulations such as EURODAC, the Temporary Protection Directive, the Asylum 
Procedures Directive and the Dublin Regulation (Fullerton, 2016, p. 65-66). These are 
only a few of the many examples. Important to note is that the laws made in the 
international EU environment have to be respected and executed by all member states 
(Conway, 2015). These laws have to be incorporated into the national legislation 
system of the member state (Conway, 2015).  
 The Dublin regulation originally dates back to the 1990s and started off as a 
Convention. Back then it was only signed by twelve member states and was followed 
alongside other EU legal obligations. It was seen as a separate non-EU treaty. It 
originally aimed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum in different member 
states and roaming between two different member states (Fullerton, 2016, p. 66). As 
Fullerton explains, “it attempted to articulate criteria that enabled EU states to 
determine quickly which state was the most appropriate to render an asylum decision 
on the merits” (Fullerton, 2016, p. 66-67). When the Dublin convention became 
official EU Law in 2003, it became a Regulation and was called the Dublin II 
regulation (Fullerton, 2016, p. 67). The Dublin II Regulation was designed to remove 
all the deficiencies of the original Convention (Lenart, 2012, p. 5). Such deficiencies 
were “slow operation of the system, uncertainty for applicants and Member States, 
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insufficient remedies for the refugees in orbit phenomenon, risk of chain refoulement, 
lack of proper readmission rules and supervision and disproportionate burden 
imposed on Member States with external borders” (Lenart, 2012, p. 5). The two main 
goals of the Dublin II regulation were similar as to the ones of the original Dublin 
convention. These namely involved stopping refugees from circulating between 
different member states in which they are neither allowed to stay nor leave (Lenart, 
2012). The following goal was to prevent asylum shopping. This involved stopping 
refugees applying for asylum in different member states. The main goal was to stop 
refugees applying for asylum in states of which they know have the most lenient 
policy and practice in this respect (Lenart, 2012, p. 5). The heart of the Dublin II 
regulation was to provide the member states with more exact criteria for determining 
which state is responsible for taking the asylum claimant (Fullerton, 2016, p. 67). The 
most crucial and game-changing modification incorporated into the Dublin II 
regulation was the rule that the member state in which the asylum seeker first enters 
the EU is called responsible for the further procedures of the claimant (Fullerton, 
2016, p. 68). The Dublin II regulation depends on a EU-wide fingerprint database of 
asylum seekers organize and provided by EURODAC (Fullerton, 2016, p. 68). This 
system was launched in 2000 and records the fingerprints, country of origin and other 
personal data (Fullerton, 2016, p. 69). The database can provide member states with 
information about the individual and can inform them whether the asylum seeker has 
previously sought asylum in a different member state. If so, the Dublin II regulation 
may then claim that this member state in question is responsible for further 
procedures and is forced to admit the refugee into its territory (Fullerton, 2016, p. 69).  
 As one would expect, the Dublin II regulation was also criticized and forced 
the European Commission to propose amendments (Hruschka, 2014). These 
amendments were implemented in June 2013 (Hruschka, 2014, p. 470). Again, “the 
main aim was to enhance effectiveness in the application of the Dublin system and to 
ensure higher standards of protection for persons subjected to the Dublin procedure” 
(Hruschka, 2014, p. 470). The main improvement made in the Dublin III regulation is 
that it has broadened its scope and has been considerably widened. It now includes 
not only asylum seekers, however all people seeking international protection 
(Hruschka 2014, p. 472).  
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What are the failures of the Dublin regulation?  
 
 First of all, the main conclusion drawn from the interviews held is that the 
regulation is outdated (Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018; ter Heerdt, 
personal communication, May 17, 2018; Diez, personal communication, June 6, 
2018). Even though the regulation has been adjusted several times during the recent 
years, the original convention was based on a situation that was unknown to the high 
influx of asylum seekers Europe experienced during 2015-2016. As has been stated 
before, it originally dates back to the 90’s, a time where the Western part of Europe 
was experiencing a different kind of influx of asylum seekers all coming from the 
eastern part of Europe. The main difference between then and now, as Maas claims, is 
that these asylum seekers would return back as soon as peace was found (personal 
communication, May 6, 2018). The member states now are expected to integrate all 
these thousands of asylum seekers into their society. Europe is not able to handle this 
because the refugee regulation was never written for situations like these (Maas, 
personal communication, May 6, 2018). As Maas states, the Dublin regulation was 
created for a refugee entering the state individually. As Diez adds on to this, “we do 
have agreements on quality, however we do not have agreements on quantity” 
(personal communication, June 6, 2018).  
 Second of all, the Regulation forces too much pressure on the states that form 
the external border of the Union (Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018). 
Seeing as the Regulation claims that the state of first entry should be held responsible 
for the further procedures of the asylum seekers, this gives the states that form the 
external border a larger amount of responsibility that seems rather unfair. The 
majority of the newspapers analyzed provided the same conclusion. An article in the 
newspaper ‘Trouw’ explains how Frans Timmermans, the vicepresident of the 
European Commission, argues that the Dublin regulation forces all the burdens on the 
small bordering member states of the EU (Schmidt, 2016, April 7). He claims that the 
current Dublin regulation system does not work and explains how the EU is in need of 
finding new regulations (Schmidt, 2016, April 7). 
 A third conclusion that can be drawn from analyzing both the interviews and 
the newspapers is that Europe is lacking one general well functioning EU asylum 
policy followed by all member states. Even though EU law has to be incorporated by 
all member states into their national legislation, the member states are given too much 
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freedom to apply their own national approach (Tempelman, 2016, March 19). The 
different procedures that are executed by the member states differ too much (Diez, 
personal communication, June 6, 2018). Regulations such as the amount accepted by 
member states, the time frame needed processing all applicants and the conditions of 
the shelter provided by the member states are unequal. This results in an uneven 
treatment and gives the asylum seekers the opportunity to choose in which member 
state they prefer applying for asylum.  
 
What is the position of the Dutch government towards the Dublin regulation?  
  
 When studying the Dutch position towards the Dublin regulation according to 
the newspaper articles and the interviews conducted, one can state that the 
Netherlands attaches value to it. Nevertheless, since the state is not positioned at the 
outside borders of the EU, the Netherlands was not forced to deal with many Dublin 
claimants during the crisis (Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018). Most 
asylum seekers entered via the airport or via the harbor of Rotterdam and were 
therefore automatically the responsibility of the Dutch government (Maas, personal 
communication, May 6, 2018). The Dublin claimants that did enter in the Netherlands 
were easily dealt with seeing as these were not many. In general, the Netherlands is an 
advocate of all EU regulations and finds it important that these endure and are dealt 
with properly. Both Maas (May 6, 2018) and ter Heerdt (May 17, 2018) explicitly 
claim how the Dutch government wishes to adhere all European treaties and European 
laws (personal communication).  
 
What should be improved in the future?  
 
 All interviewees argue that it is vital to create a well functioning EU asylum 
policy that should be applicable to all member states. According to ter Heerdt, it is 
strange that the existing EU policies wvis-à-vis refugees differ so much, seeing as 
Europe did create the CEAS (personal communication, May 17, 2018). One solution 
that ter Heerdt suggests that will facilitate creating one general EU asylum law is the 
creation of the European Asylum Agency (personal communication, May 17, 2018). 
This concept was proposed by different EU institutions and the Netherlands was a 
great advocate for this suggestion (Ter Heerdt, personal communication, May 17, 
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2018). The idea is that the European Asylum Agency creates working groups in all 
EU member states that will study troubled nations. These groups will collect data 
about certain risk groups and will make reports discussing these specific issues. These 
reports will be shared among all member states in the EU. After collecting reports, the 
agency will then be able to provide help when creating new policies, specifically 
taking into account the risk groups. Overall, this should help in dealing with all issues 
in a more European integrated manner. As Ter Heerdt explains, the biggest challenge 
is to erase the different national approaches towards asylum seekers and other 
European issues (personal communication, May 17, 2018). Sharing knowledge and 
finding solutions within the EU is one way of doing this.  
 Another solution provided includes focusing on amending the existing Dublin 
regulation. Ter Heerdt discusses a solution that was provided by the secretary of state 
of the Netherlands (personal communication, May 17, 2018). This solution states that 
the asylum seeker should return to one of the states through which it has travelled. 
This would be a good deal for countries such as the Netherlands, seeing as hardly any 
individual travels through their territory, as this is not a logical route (ter Heerdt, 
personal communication, May 17, 2018). This would mean that the Netherlands 
would almost always have the opportunity to send asylum seekers back to the country 
they travelled through. According to ter Heerdt, this would provide a solution for the 
heavy burden sharing the bordering states of the EU experience. It would spread the 
asylum seekers more throughout the rest of the EU member states. Diez agrees with 
the fact that more focus should be put on creating new distribution regulations, since 
this is one of the main deficiencies of the Dublin regulation (personal communication, 
June 6, 2018).  
 The newspaper Trouw discussed solutions that were provided by the European 
Commission (Schmidt , 2016, April 7). The Commission provided the EU with two 
options. The first option was that the Dublin regulation would be maintained, 
however that the focus will be on division regulations. This includes that rules will be 
made about how to divide the asylum seekers fairly among the member states in order 
to make sure that the external bordering states to not carry all the burdens. The second 
option is that the asylum seekers do not apply for asylum in one state but in the 
European Union in general. This would mean that the European Union itself would 
have to deal with the asylum process, instead of its member states individually. This 
gives the supranational institutions more power and decreases the sovereignty of the 
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separate member states. The same solution offered by Maas, in which she states that it 
is vital to focus on registering asylum seekers outside of Europe (personal 
communication, May 6, 2018). This way it will be easier to gain an overview of all 
approaching asylum seekers and spread them equally among all member states. It will 
also stop the asylum seekers committing the dangerous journey to reach Europe 
(Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018). If asylum seekers know before hand 
that they will not gain asylum in any member state in Europe, they will not make the 
journey. It will also spare the asylum seekers a lot of waiting time, since the answer to 
whether they will be given asylum will be given straight away. The situation now 
includes asylum seekers waiting for many years before knowing whether they will 
gain an official asylum. This results in refugee camps becoming too crowded and 
living standards decreasing to the bare minimum or even below. The same solution 
was offered by Sommer (2016, January 23) and Peeperkorn (2016, January 28) in 
their articles written in the newspaper ‘De Volkskrant’. According to them, 
registration should happen outside of Europe in order to be able to reduce the amount 
of asylum seekers crossing the dangerous sea and risking their lives.    
 Nevertheless, according to Diez, the Dublin regulation should not be read with 
such exactness (personal communication, June 6, 2018). He claims that the rule of the 
country of first entry does indeed apply, however there are many other rules made in 
the regulation that have a larger priority and should be applied first (personal 
communication, June 6, 2018). Examples given are family members residing in a 
specific member state or visas given by embassies. These are all situations where that 
specific member state is held responsible and not the state of first entry (Diez, 
personal communication, June 6, 2018). According to Diez the list is endless and only 
when none of these rules apply, that is when the state of first entry becomes 
responsible. Nonetheless, he still argues that the Dublin regulation is an important 
agreement made within EU asylum law. Without the regulation, the EU would not 
have survived the crisis (Diez, personal communication, June 6, 2018). The regulation 
provides a filtering effect and influences the decision what member state to approach 
made by the asylum seekers. He does clarify that this does not count for all people. 
The refugees who are fleeing war and are in great danger in their home country will 
make the dangerous to Europe, no matter what. The asylum seekers who are fleeing in 
the hope to find a better future will probably rethink their decision twice (Diez, 
personal communication, June 6, 2018). Diez also emphasizes that he agrees with the 
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fact the Dublin regulation forces the majority of the burden on the external bordering 
states. However, he claims there are still many asylum seekers who manage to escape 
the regulations made and eventually do end up in other Northern Western EU member 
states. He also wants to emphasize the fact that even when an asylum seekers applies 
for asylum in a state when it has already done so in another, there are only a few cases 
where the asylum seeker actually does get sent back (Diez, personal communication, 
June 6, 2018). A large percent of these claimants concerned disappear. This has 
several reasons, such as the fact that many go in hiding when they know they will be 
sent back. Another explanation is the member states involved do not manage to come 
to an agreement about the returning processes. Deadlines are not made and 
disagreements are not resolved. According to Diez, it is a rather complicated process, 
where responsibility plays a large role (personal communication, June 6, 2018). The 
same has been stated by Versteegh in the newspaper ‘NRC Handelsblad’ (2016, May 
4). He claims that expelling refugees has become harder throughout the years and 
argues that almost 40 percent of the planned expulsions are cancelled last minute. 
Ambiguity concerning the European regulations and errors in the administration 
process result in the detentions becoming unfeasible (Versteegh, 2016, May 4). 
 
Section 2 – The Failure of the Schengen zone  
 
Another main conclusion drawn from the analysis of the interviewees and the 
different newspapers is the present discussion concerning the Schengen zone. Below 
this thesis will discuss what the Schengen zone is, why it failed and what should be 
improved in the future according to the newspapers and interviewees. 
 
What is the Schengen zone?  
 
 After the Second World War, Europe focused on preventing the happening of 
such a horrific event in any near future. It was vital to cooperate in order to preserve 
peace and liberty (Keister, 2013). Together with this, Europe believed that 
“transnational economic and political integration was needed in order for the 
continent to gain back its global influence and power (Keister, 2013). This was done 
by a process called enlargement (Keister, 2013, p. 119-120). This involved expanding 
its transnational borders by including new member states. As Keister explains, “to 
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promote long-term stability and success, enlargement is based in a commonality of 
values in democracy and the rule of law, peace and freedom, and tolerance and 
solidarity” (2013, p. 120). According to Keister, a successful enlargement strategy 
must balance three elements, namely economic integration, political integration and 
autonomous nation-states” (2013, p. 126). Expanding its borders and gaining new 
membership gave the Union new economic opportunities and made the continent 
prosper (Keister, 2013, p. 120). One vital agreement made during the enlargement 
process was the foundation of the Schengen Zone. The Schengen zone was 
established in 1985 in the Luxembourg town of Schengen and signed by Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany (Felbermayr, Gröschl & Steinwachs, 
2018, p. 335). As of today, the treaty has been signed by 22 member states. The 
agreement aimed “to facilitate free movement of persons and goods across borders by 
removal of internal borders” (Karanja, 2008, p. 3). The agreement abolished regular 
identity checks at all EU internal border and only allowed them in emergency 
situations for a specific limited period of time (Felbermayr, Gröschl & Steinwachs, 
2008, p. 335). In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed which meant that the 
agreement was now officially incorporated into the EU legal framework (Keister, 
2013, p. 125). Similar to the Dublin regulation, the member states of the EU were 
forced to incorporate the different regulations of Schengen into their national 
legislation. Seeing as it became official EU law, all member states were obliged to 
respect and execute the Regulation. As Zaitotti mentions, the Schengen regime is a 
system that consists of both supranational and intergovernmental features (2011, p. 3). 
Decisions are made with regional actors, which are composed of both governmental 
national governments and supranational EU institutions (Zaiotti, 2011, p. 3). The 
Schengen Regulation forces states to give up part of their sovereignty since national 
border control is given to their supranational actors (Zaiotti, 2011, p. 3). At the same 
time, such abdication includes risk-sharing behavior, seeing as one becomes 
responsible for risks that are not born at home but in the community one is part of 
(Keister, 2013, p. 126).  
 
Why did the Schengen zone fail?  
 
 As Boogaard explains, the Schengen agreement stipulates that member states 
are allowed to reintroduce border controls for a period of up to six months (2016, 
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January 26). However, during the refugee crisis, Schengen incorporated an emergency 
article into its regulation which allowed member states to extend the term of border 
controls up to two years (Boogaard, 2016, January 26). This was done because several 
member sates such as Germany and Austria, had exceeded the period of six months 
and were not willing to open up borders in any near future. This resulted in a domino 
effect, where many other EU member states also decided practice stricter border 
controls (Elshout, 2016, February 10). Many Eastern European countries even 
decided to close their borders and were not willing to accept any asylum seeker. 
Eventually even countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Germany decided to put on 
extra border controls (Elshout, 2016, January 21). The idea of open borders was lost. 
The EU even decided to apply stricter policies on the visa free travelling to and into 
Europe (van der Mee, 2016, January 13). Anti-immigration ideologies such as the one 
in Hungary spread around Europe and many other member states started to believe 
that it was best to keep all borders closed (den Hartog, 2016, January 30). Similar to 
West European countries, Eastern European countries also started to collaborate. 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland joined together and aimed at closing 
down the escape route via Greece and the Balkans (Kok, February 15). Other member 
states such as Slovakia, Austria, Macedonia and Serbia also joined together and made 
an agreement that did not include Greece. Their aim was to make sure no immigrants 
coming from Greece would attempt to enter their territory. The research conducted 
described this as the failure of the Regulation. According to the newspapers one of the 
main reasons the Schengen zone failed was, similar to the failure of the Dublin 
Regulation, due to the different approach each member state had towards the refugee 
crisis. As Tempelman discusses, there was a clear division noted within the European 
Union (2016, January 15). The Western part of Europe was considered open and 
accessible towards the large influx of asylum seekers (Tempelman, 2016, January 15). 
The Eastern part of Europe was quite the opposite and was not willing to accept any 
incoming refugee (Tempelman, 2016, January 15). Both the newspapers and the 
interviewees argue that the main reason for this is because each region carries a 
different history. Maas and Diez argue how the West Europe has a history of 
receiving large amounts of immigrants, coming mostly from East Europe (personal 
communication, May 6, 2018; personal communication, June 6, 2018). During the 
1990s, Eastern Europe was struck by a war due to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 
which resulted in a large amount of people coming from Kosovo and Bosnia fleeing 
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to Western European countries. This would explain the somewhat more open 
approach West Europe decided to take during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016 (Maas, 
personal communication, May 6, 2018; Diez, personal communication, June 6, 2018). 
The East European countries per contra, were mostly left with traumas from war of 
the 1990s, which could explain their negative approach towards the asylum seekers 
(Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018; Diez, personal communication, June 6, 
2018). These countries had no previous experience with unfamiliar individuals 
bringing different norms and values to their country. They are pleased with the 
stability and peace their region has achieved and are suspicious of anyone willing to 
remove this. Nevertheless, these two different approaches towards incoming asylum 
seekers creates friction and instability within the EU. Beunders explains how the 
Western European countries felt abandoned let down by its fellow East European 
member states (2016, March 1). During the previous decades, the Western European 
countries received all refugees coming from Eastern Europe and were accepted into 
their society. It therefore felt unfair that the Western European countries were now 
expected to carry all the burdens (Beunders, 2016, March 1). According to them, the 
Eastern European countries should now return the favor and help its fellow member 
stats by accepting asylum seekers into their territory (Beunders, 2016, March 1).  
 Another reason the Schengen zone failed according to the research was due to 
the fact the different EU institutions were lacking proper leadership qualities and 
overview of the situation (Peeperkorn, 2016, February 18). The European 
Commission failed to gain an overview of the situation and therefore saw no other 
way than allowing a suspension of the Schengen regulations. The EU was not able to 
grasp a hand on this and did not punish these violations made. The lack of leadership 
and the despair found within the EU institutions lead the member states to losing their 
faith in the union (Peeperkorn, 2016, February 18). This resulted in the member states 
applying more intergovernmental approaches. In addition, some newspapers also 
discuss the lack of knowledge about the EU as a problem (de Boer, 2016, January 19). 
Many EU citizens do not know how the EU functions and how it is organized. More 
importantly, most individuals residing in the EU do not know what benefits the EU 
brings. This can automatically result in the rise of extreme right political parties in the 
EU (de Boer, January 19). The citizens of the union are scared by the large amount of 
refugees entering their territory without fully understanding what they are scared of. 
Statements made by their surrounding environment will scare them. Examples are 
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arguments made which claim that these new incoming refugees will steal jobs or will 
bring terrorism into their country. This results in individuals voting for extremist 
right-wing parties, since their ideologies match the frustrations and worries of these 
particular political groups within society. The xenophobe expressions made by the 
rightist parties attract many people because it is the easiest for them to hear and 
understand.  The only solution, in their eyes, is to close borders and keep them out of 
the EU. 
 Another problem Diez however points out is that member states should be 
willing to accept help (personal communication, June 6, 2018). He argues that it is a 
state’s own responsibility to secure their own external borders and to work with a well 
functioning asylum application system. If a member state realizes it will not be able to 
handle the situation, it will be their responsibility to ask for help (Diez, personal 
communication, June 6, 2018). In addition, states should also be willing to accept 
help. Diez argues that this is one of the main deficiencies that occurred during the 
crisis (personal communication, June 6, 2018). Member states such as the ones that 
form the border of the EU where not prepared for the large influx of asylum seekers. 
Diez argues that these specific states asked for help from their fellow member states 
too late (personal communication, June 6, 2018). Most of the time, the help offered 
was also not accepted or not appreciated. In addition, there was a large mismatch 
between what was said on paper and what was actually executed (Diez, personal 
communication, June 6, 2018). Many member states did not feel the responsibility to 
execute the tasks that they had been given in order to help their fellow member states.
  
What is the position of the Dutch government towards the Schengen zone 
regulation? 
 
 According to the newspapers and the interviewees, the Netherlands was 
struggling with what position it wanted to take towards the Schengen zone. On the 
one hand it aimed at doing as much as possible, however on the other hand it did not 
want to become too attractive for asylum seekers (Besselink, 2016, March 17; Diez, 
personal communication, June 6, 2016). It worried that it would not be able to handle 
a large influx. As has been stated before, the Netherlands found it important to respect 
all European regulations made. According to Maas and ter Heerdt, the state can 
therefore be seen as pro-Europe (personal communication, May 6, 2018; personal 
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communication, May 17, 2018). Nevertheless, because it aimed to follow all 
regulations it did realize it had to cooperate with fellow member states and create 
negotiations that discussed the large influx of asylum seekers approach the state 
(Maas, personal communication, May 6, 2018). It realized how some European 
member states, especially member states in the Eastern part of Europe, were going 
against the European regulations made. It therefore decided to focus on member states 
that share their ideologies and goals. Ter Heerdt explains how the Netherlands joined 
North Western European consultations and meetings that focused on approaching the 
refugee together (personal communication, May 17, 2018). In summary, the 
Netherlands never had the intention to close its borders according to the interviewees. 
Boogaard however describes the position Mark Rutte took towards the Schengen 
zone. During his position as president of the EU, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte was thriving for a decrease in the amount of asylum seekers arriving in Europe 
(Boogaard, 2016, January 20). His approach to gain back control over the refugee 
crisis was by aiming to reduce the amount of asylum seekers arriving at the EU 
(Boogaard, 2016, January 20). Rutte held a speech towards the European Parlement in 
which he stated how the Netherlands wants a decrease in the amount of asylum 
seekers entering the EU, if not Europe will close its internal borders (Boogaard, 2016, 
January 20). This demonstrates another side of the Dutch approach and brings Rutte’s 
ideologies into spotlight. Rutte’s initial focus was not to close the borders but to bring 
back the amount of refugees entering the EU to zero. His approach was to persuade 
the asylum seekers to not travel to Europe in the first instance and he argued it was 
important seek solutions outside the EU (van Galen, 2016, January 27).  
  
What should be improved in the future?  
    
 The newspapers discussed possible solutions in order to reduce the severity of 
the crisis without closing borders. Several articles focused on Merkel’s approach 
during the crisis and motivated the Netherlands to follow this (Rohmensen, 2016, 
March 1; Westerveen, 2016, May 7). Even though some criticized Merkel for 
ignoring the Dublin Regulation, many also admired her courage and respected her for 
her solidarity. Instead of closing her border, she chose to open her border and put no 
limit on the amount of asylum seekers who were allowed to enter Germany 
(Rohmensen, 2016, March 1). According to them, this would be the best possible 
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solution to offer the asylum seekers. Second of all, there were articles that claimed 
that the European Union does not need new regulations (Noordervliet, 2016, March 
12). According to them Europe already has valuable regulations, however it fails to 
live up to these. Therefore, the Schengen regulation does not need to be revised 
however only needs to be respected. One crucial solution found was offered by 
Dempsey in the Volkskrant, in which he suggests that it is important for member 
states to share their knowledge (2016, March 4). Schengen is about open borders, but 
also about being transparent in all other aspects (Dempsey, 2016, March 4). This 
includes transferring knowledge about asylum seekers entering their territory, but also 
about advising one another about how to approach the asylum seekers best. Member 
states should share advise on how to approach certain policies and regulations used to 
improve the living standards of the asylum seekers residing in their territory. In 
addition, it is also vital to educate the EU individuals residing in the union about its 
different functions. It is important to demonstrate them the benefits the EU gives them 
(van Dalen & Segers, 2016, June 24; de Boer, 2016, January 19). This will reduce the 
distrust towards the union and will improve the relationships between the different 
member states.  
 Similar to the solution provided for the Dublin regulation, the interviewees 
and newspaper articles argue to focus on the process of registration. According to 
Diez, it is vital to register all incoming asylum seekers since this is the only way to 
know who is entering your country (personal communication, June 6, 2018). Only 
when proper registration is made can a member state know to whom it should provide 
proper and fair help. Diez claims that this requires preparedness, especially when 
there is a large influx (personal communication, June 6, 2018). Europe consists of 
many organizations that can help with this process, such as Frontex and support teams 
of European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (Diez, personal communication, June 6, 
2018). They can help with the registration process since they contain the information 
about the asylum seekers and possess essential instruments. These solutions add up to 
the ones provided for the Dublin Regulation. 
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Section 3 – The need of a EU-Turkey agreement 
 
What is the EU-Turkey agreement?  
 
 The EU-Turkey agreement was an agreement made during the peak of the 
crisis in March 2016 (Gkliatli, 2017). The agreement however originally dates back to 
2002 (Gkliatli, 2017, p. 86-87). During this period of time, the EU and Turkey had 
started negotiations that would discuss the readmission of refugees into the Union 
(Gkliatli, 2017).  After several negotiations were suspended throughout the years, a 
final draft was prepared and initialed in June 2012 (Gkliatli, 2017, p. 87). It was only 
until the EU was forced to find a solution for the high influx of asylum seekers 
entering its territory that it approached the EU-Turkey agreement and argued that this 
was the only option left (Gkliatli, 2017). The different EU officials and state 
representatives chose to re-negotiate the agreement with Turkey made back in 2002 
(Gkliatli, 2017, p. 87). On the 20th of March 2016, the EU and Turkey came to an 
agreement and officially implemented what we now know as the ‘EU-Turkey 
agreement’ (Goalwin, 2018). As Goalwin explains, “the deal was the latest effort to 
‘stem the tide’ of refugees who had fled violence in the Middle East, civil war in 
Syria and the rise of the Islamic State, passing through Turkey and into the EU” 
(2018, p. 121). As Gkliatli explains, the deal foresees several operational procedures 
(2017, p. 87). First of all, all migrants that arrive in Greece illegal after the 20th of 
March 2016 are to be returned back to Turkey (2017, p. 87). Second of all, any Syrian 
who is returned to Turkey will be sent to the EU. The EU is forced to accept all these 
resettled Syrian asylum seekers (Gkliatli, 2017, p. 87). The deal included EU having 
to accept the same number of Syrian refugees as Turkey would accept illegal refugees 
coming rom Greece Gkliatli 2017, p. 87-88). As would be expected, this agreement 
brought with it a large logistical process. Greece, Turkey and the EU were forced to 
create well functioning organized schemes in order to ensure the relocation processes 
of the asylum seekers would run without complications. Several plans were made 
such as the pre-screening and identification of refugees in both Greece and Turkey 
(Gkliatli, 2017) In addition, human rights guarantees and dignified humanitarian 
conditions in the refugee camps were another prerequisite in both Greece and Turkey 
(Gkliatli, 2017, p. 88). The deal gave both the EU and Turkey benefits. For the EU it 
was a solution to spread out the large influx of asylum seekers towards another 
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territory that was not theirs. It was also a solution to the problem of the expanding 
refuge camps in and around Greece. The conditions in these camps were worrying 
and were becoming poorer due to the increasing amount of refugees arriving. For 
Turkey it was an opportunity to gain significant political leverage. It was hoping to 
create a better relationship with the Union and open up conversation about becoming 
an official EU member state. Other regulations such as implementing regulations 
considering visa-free travelling for the Turks in Europe were also on the agenda.  
 
What are the failures of the EU-Turkey agreement? 
 
 According to the majority of the newspapers, the EU-Turkey agreement had 
many deficiencies. First of all, many articles explained how the Turkish government 
violates human rights within its own nation (van Zon, 2016, March 8; Alonso, 2016 
March 17). Several articles discussed how the Turkish president had abandoned 
certain newspapers in its own state since he did not agree with the position these 
papers took (Cerit, 2016, March 14; Alonso, 2016, March 7). They were seen as a 
threat towards his presidency and were insulting his ideologies according to him 
(Cerit, 2016, March 14). This action was alarming for many member states of the EU, 
since it contradicts to the democratic norms and values the EU wishes to portray. In 
addition, Turkey was not considered as a safe country according to the EU regulations 
(Cerit, 2016, February 17; Eikelboom, 2016, March 31). Especially negotiations about 
permitting EU access for Turkey were criticized, since the state does not fulfill the 
requirements that are set in order to gain access to the EU and becoming an official 
member state (van Santen, 2016, March 17). The newspapers describe the behavior of 
the Turkish president Erdogan as one of a dictator. The newspapers express their 
shock towards the EU about the fact that the Union even considers accepting Turkey 
as a new member state (Azmani & Lucassen, 2016, March 10). According to them, 
Turkey has to undergo a severe transition before even starting negotiations about 
gaining EU membership. The newspapers also express their worries about negotiating 
with Turkey. Seeing as it is not considered a safe state, they argue that asylum seekers 
should not be sent back to a state such as Turkey. According to them, the safety of the 
asylum seekers will not be secured and their human rights might be violated 
(Kranenburg & van der Walle, 2016, March 16).  
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 Another failure mentioned was how Turkey was blackmailing and betraying 
the EU in order to gain certain political benefits, such as becoming an official member 
of the Union (Alonso, 2016, May 3; Yucel, 2016, May 12; Peeperkorn, 2016, May 
12). The interest of Turkey was not to help the EU and the many asylum seekers, but 
to gain political power within the globalized world. At the same time, the newspapers 
claimed it was a scandal that the EU ‘needed’ Turkey to resolve the crisis (de Koning, 
2016, May 6). According to them, the EU should have focused on dissolving the crisis 
with the regulations it has available. The newspapers also discuss the horrific 
circumstances of the refugee camps in Greece. They argue how even though the 
agreement should have improved the situations in Greece, it only worsened it 
(“Idomeni heeft nog een kelin beetje hoop, tegen beter weten in”, 2016, March 17). 
Due to the EU-Turkey agreement, many asylum seekers were stuck in Greece. The 
agreement did not allow any refugees to travel further into Europe. The resettlement 
regulations between Turkey, Greece and the EU were not executed properly. As a 
result, the refugee camps in Greece became overcrowded which lead to a severe 
decrease in the living conditions within the camps. The newspapers explain how the 
UN made several reports about the many human rights being violated within these 
camps (Kettenis, 2016, March 24; Kettenis, 2016, April 7). It argues that Greece does 
not have the capacity to protect all refugees. The amount of people in need of human 
right protection has increased to such a number that offering protection to all has 
become impossible (“Vluchtelingen vast in havenstad Piraeus”, 2016, March 25). 
Other NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch, also brought out reports about the 
worrying circumstances in the camps in Greece and the failing of the Greek 
government to provide proper help towards the asylum seekers (“Vluchtelingen vast 
in havenstad Piraeus”, 2016, March 25). Some newspaper articles explain how many 
human rights organizations, such as ‘Doctors of the World’, have claimed that they 
will no longer provide help in the areas where the asylum seekers are staying since 
they do not agree with the approach the EU is taking (“AZG weigert geld van EU en 
lidstaten”, 2016, June 18; Kettenis, 2016, March 24). They consider Turkey as a 
threat to peace and stability, especially in the EU.  
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What is the position of the Dutch government towards the EU-Turkey agreement? 
 
 The position of the Dutch government towards the agreement was somewhat 
divergent and created a division within Dutch politics. The newspaper articles argued 
how some Dutch politicians were moderate about the agreement and saw it is a good 
solution whereas others were very against it. During his presidency of the EU, Rutte 
felt an urge to come to an agreement with Turkey. As was discussed before, Rutte was 
focused on keeping the incoming influx of asylum seekers as low as possible. His 
main goal was to bring back the numbers of incoming refugees to 0. According to the 
majority of the articles, Rutte advocated the agreement because the felt that this was 
the only solution that could be found on short notice (Obbema & Peeperkorn, 2016, 
February 11). Alonso described Rutte as the most European Rutte the Netherlands had 
ever experienced (2016, January 21). He believed that the European manner would be 
the only way to resolve the crisis. Even though he did not agree with the approach 
Erdogan took at times, he was still convinced Europe had to convince Turkey to 
accept all migrants back into his country (“Kort”, 2016, March 7). The division in the 
Dutch government could be noticed due to the approach the opposition parties took. 
Different regulations were suggested that somewhat seemed to be connected to the 
EU-Turkey agreement however took a different turn. Diederik Samsom, the leader of 
the Dutch leftist party ‘Parij van de Arbeid’ and member of the second chamber in the 
Dutch government suggested the creation of a ‘airbridge’ (Kok, 2016, March 3). The 
idea was to create a regulation where 400 refugees would be transferred from Turkey 
to Europe everyday for a month long. Samsom argued that this would remove charges 
for Turkey and would the situation somewhat easier for them. Seeing as Samsom 
introduced this new regulation and promoted it as the solution for the crisis, many 
politicians adopted the plan under the name ‘Samsom-plan’. The VVD, the rightist 
Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, was not an advocate of this plan 
(Kok, 2016, March 3). The conservative liberal party was afraid of giving Turkey too 
much power with such a plan. They argued it was not correct to reward Turkey 
without expecting anything in return. Another article discusses how the VVD and the 
PVDA had many arguments during the crisis (Hoedeman & den Hartog, 2016, March 
11). Their views and ideologies seemed to clash a lot, especially when it came to the 
EU-Turkey agreement. However, eventually the PvdA managed to convince Rutte of 
this plan. Rutte argued that the Samsom plan should be seen separate from the EU-
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Turkey agreement and that it is a different component. He did argue that the plan 
fitted in well with the overall EU-Turkey agreement (Hoedeman & den Hartog, 2016, 
March 11).   
 
What should be improved in the future? 
 
 The majority of the articles were critical about the EU-Turkey agreement. 
They argue the EU is following incorrect policies and are focusing on the wrong 
aspects. According to them, the EU realizes that their policies do not work, however 
keep on attempting to adjust them and stick to them (de Gruyter, 2016, May 21). 
Instead, the EU should be changing their direction and create new policies and 
regulations (de Wijk, 2016, February 5). This is somewhat similar to the conclusion 
made in the prior sections. Instead of focusing on keeping the number of the entering 
asylum seekers low, the EU should be focusing on improving the living standard of 
the accepted asylum seekers in the union. In addition, they should be focusing on 
making policies that will allow the EU and its member states to accept as many 
asylum seekers as possible. As this newspaper article claims, the only solution for the 
asylum crisis is on the short term to face their failures and for the long term to change 
the whole EU asylum policy (Spijkerbroek, 2016, March 19). As expected, there was 
also a minority of the articles that argued the EU-Turkey agreement was the best 
possible solution (Peeperkorn, 2016, April 16). This article argued that this agreement 
would help bring back the crisis under control by stimulating asylum seekers to stay 
in Turkey and not risk the travel to Europe. The asylum seekers will more likely have 
the right for legal resettlement in Europe when staying in Turkey and being 
transferred by official organizations and institutions (Peeperkorn, 2016, April 16). 
One article describes how the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, called the EU-Turkey agreement a real game changer (Alonso, 2016, March 
8). Accroding to Juncker , the deal creates a possibility to get a grip on the illegal 
migration and attempt to stop it (Alonso, 2016, March 8). This is because the amount 
of immigration will decrease, since the asylum seekers will know their chances of 
success are not as high. Therefore, the illegal smugglers will struggle to find enough 
work available.  
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Discussion 
 
 When having analyzed the results, one notices how the majority of the 
newspaper articles were critical about solidarity found in the EU. As has been 
demonstrated in the findings, the majority of the newspapers argued that negative 
instrumental solidarity was more dominant than positive instrumental solidarity. This 
means that there was a lack of instrumental solidarity in the EU during the refugee 
crisis. Following up, the newspapers argued that negative normative solidarity was 
more dominant than positive normative solidarity. This means that there was a lack of 
normative solidarity in the EU during the refugee crisis. Overall, the negative 
instrumental solidarity was more dominant than the negative normative solidarity. 
This means that according to the newspapers, the lack of instrumental solidarity was 
larger than the lack of normative solidarity. The following section will analyze the 
findings and discuss them in relation with the theories used. 
 
Instrumental solidarity 
 
 One of the main conclusions drawn from the results is how the EU was 
lacking a well functioning asylum policy that is applicable for all member states 
throughout the union. The current existing regulations create an unfair share of burden 
and give the member states too much freedom to apply their own national approach. 
This creates an uneven influx and an uneven treatment of asylum seekers when 
having once entered the EU. The failure of both the Dublin regulation and the 
Schengen zone demonstrated this. The theory of instrumental solidarity argues how 
the propensity of demonstrating solidarity will be higher among individuals when 
there is large degree of self-interest of being part of the community. Therefore, in 
relation to instrumental solidarity, the results argue it is vital to create a well 
functioning asylum policy across the EU. Amending the existing asylum policies and 
focusing on the strengths of each individual member state will improve the decree of 
solidarity found in the EU. The states should all feel equally treated and should carry 
the same amount of burdens. The EU should focus on creating new policies which 
cover the whole process of the asylum seekers having once entered the union. This 
would include regulations such as the amount of asylum seekers allowed to enter, the 
registration process and regulations which cover the integration process of the asylum 
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seeker. These policies should be applied throughout the whole union by all its 
member states. This way there will be no different approach towards asylum seekers 
amongst the member states. It will oblige everyone to demonstrate the same amount 
of solidarity. In addition, the regulations and policies should demonstrate the states 
the benefits they will gain from cooperating with their fellow member states. Only 
then will the self-interest of being part of a community increase among the member 
states.  
 Another problem that was touched upon in the newspapers and interviewees 
was the lack of convincing leadership demonstrated by the different EU institutions. 
The results described how this resulted in increasing disagreements between the EU 
institutions and its member states. Both blamed each other for not doing enough and 
undertaking the wrong action. According to them, no one was willing to take 
responsibility. The member states felt that there was no proper governance and 
management coming from the EU institutions. In correlation to instrumental 
solidarity, the results argue that the relationship between the institutions and the 
member states needs to become clear in order for them both to be able to show 
solidarity. The structure of the union and the different functions each organ carries out 
must be interpreted correctly and equally by each member state. The EU institutions 
involved should practice stricter regulations and should become more dominant 
towards its member states. Only when this is done will the member states and the 
institutions of the union itself be able to demonstrate instrumental solidarity. 
Everyone included should be informed properly about the benefits the union brings. 
Without this, no one will be willing to become involved with the EU and the self-
interest of being part of the community will decrease.  
  Third of all, the research conducted argued how the EU was focusing on the 
wrong approach. The existing asylum policies all focus mainly on keeping the asylum 
seekers outside of the EU. Both the Dublin regulation and the EU-Turkey agreement 
included regulations that assured the majority of the EU member states that the large 
influx of asylum seekers will not reach their territory. Instead, as several sources 
mentioned, the union should focus on creating policies that would create opportunities 
for the member states to accept as many asylum seekers possible. One major solution 
provided by the sources was to force refugees to apply for asylum outside the EU. In 
addition, refugees would apply for asylum in the EU in general, instead of one 
individual member state. Regulations such as these ones forces all member states to 
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demonstrate solidarity and will help the EU incorporate many more asylum seekers 
into their union. It obliges the EU to solve the issue as one union, instead of 
approaching the issue via 28 different national regulations. The self-interest of each 
member state will, via this way, automatically become communal interest. This will 
result in an increase of instrumental solidarity. The research conducted did argue that 
the EU aims at demonstrating the correct norms and values. Most ideas demonstrated 
by the EU are all valid and fair, however the different institutions and member states 
have failed to live up to them. Therefore, the research suggests that the existing 
regulations contain useful ideas and approaches, however they should be amended to 
a certain extent in order for them to become better applicable. In correlation to 
instrumental solidarity, it is vital to create EU asylum policies that incorporate 
solidarity into them. Without instrumental solidarity found in the asylum regulations 
themselves, the member states should also not be expected to be solidary.  
 
Normative solidarity  
  
 The research demonstrated how the lack of normative solidarity in the EU 
during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016 was found to a lesser extent. The lack of 
normative solidarity was not considered being the main problem. As the theory states, 
normative solidarity is demonstrated more when there is a certain feeling of common 
identity and cohesion within a community. Therefore the conclusion can be drawn 
that, according to the research conducted, the lack of a European identity did not have 
that much of an influence on the course of the crisis. The recommendation to create a 
more integrated European identity does therefore not apply. However, this thesis 
would argue the opposite. One could claim that the division which was created within 
the Union during the refugee crisis demonstrates how Europe’s different cultural 
identities indeed play a role. The different approach towards the asylum seekers 
between the Western and Eastern European countries can be linked to a different 
cultural heritage and history. Therefore, it seems rather illogical to argue that the lack 
of a European identity was not relevant during the resolving process of the crisis. 
Thus, a logical recommendation for the EU would be to focus on future policies that 
give attention to the creation of a European identity. As has ben discussed before, one 
vital way of doing this is by educating them. Informing the individuals about the 
different European institutions and the benefits they bring them would be the best way 
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to approach this. When all citizens of all the different member states gain the same 
information about the EU, there will automatically grow a feeling of mutual 
community and identity.  
 Another example that can be used in order to argue that social solidarity is 
important is the fact that the EU turned towards Turkey in order to find a solution for 
the refugee crisis. Since Europe was forced to look outside of its own union and its 
own member states, one could state that solidarity amongst it own member states was 
lost. As has been discussed, the majority of the newspapers criticized the EU-Turkey 
agreement. The fact that the EU was forced to rely on a country that by many was 
considered as a dictatorship and that violates human rights demonstrates the desperate 
state the EU found itself in. The EU-Turkey agreement is a valid demonstration of 
how solidarity had to be found outside the EU. In relation to normative solidarity, the 
EU should focus on creating a feeling of belonging to a community amongst its 
individuals residing in the union. This will prevent the EU from being forced to seek 
solutions outside its own territory in the near future. If the member states felt an 
increased degree of European identity, they would have been more willing to help 
each other. This thesis therefore argues that normative solidarity is equally important 
to focus on as instrumental solidarity. Without normative solidarity, instrumental 
solidarity will not be possible.  
 In addition, one can conclude that Europe experienced a more 
intergovernmental approach during the refugee crisis. The different member states 
chose for their own national regulations and did not agree with the way Europe dealt 
with the crisis. The lack of both instrumental and normative solidarity can provide an 
explanation for this. Benefitting for their own national goals seemed a larger priority 
than providing aid for the fellow member states in need. Due to their own national 
values and norms, Europe applied different approaches towards the incoming asylum 
seekers. In order for the union to become more integrated, it is vital for the member 
states to start applying more supranational approaches. However, in order for this to 
happen, more solidarity is needed. This thesis argues that normative solidarity is 
equally as important for the creation of a more integrated union as instrumental 
solidarity. In order for the member states to demonstrate instrumental solidarity, 
normative solidarity is needed. The different member states have to feel connected 
with one another in order for them to be willing to provide aid towards each other. 
Without a certain feeling of European identity, no member state will understand what 
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benefits they can bring one another and themselves. Overall, this thesis argues that an 
integrated union will be able to deal with crises such as the one from 2015-216 better. 
Since many academics and politicians claim that the EU is becoming less integrated, 
it is vital to understand what should be done in order to prevent this from happening. 
Connecting solidarity to integration is therefore crucial. Demonstrating solidarity will 
lead to more integration, which will eventually lead to a better functioning Union.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The research demonstrated us that according to the Dutch media and 
government officials, solidarity in communities such as the EU is vital for several 
reasons. First of all, without solidarity, the EU would not be able to rely on the well 
functioning of its regulations and policies. Solidarity has to come from both the EU 
institutions and its member states. The EU institutions should be concerned with 
assuring that every one will carry the same amount of burden and that everyone is 
forced to demonstrate the same amount of solidarity. The member states have to be 
willing to accept and demonstrate solidarity towards the regulations made by the EU. 
The EU institutions are given the responsibility to incorporate solidarity into their 
policies; the member states are given the responsibility to follow these solidary 
regulations described in the policies.  Second of all, solidarity creates unification. The 
failure of both the Dublin regulation and the Schengen zone demonstrated how the 
EU was disintegrating. The member states decided to apply their own national 
regulations instead of following the EU regulations. The focus was put more on what 
benefits their own nation instead of attempting to help their fellow member states in 
the union. An integrated union is able to deal with any future crises better than a 
disintegrated union. In order for a union to remain integrated and successful, 
solidarity is vital. Third of all, solidarity creates acceptation. It creates a pleasant 
atmosphere in every community in which all individuals involved respect each other. 
It benefits the relationship between the member states, the EU institutions the 
different EU inhabitants. In correlation to the refugee crisis, solidarity creates 
acceptance towards all incoming asylum seekers. Every organ within the EU will be 
willing to integrate the asylum seekers into their society. As our research has 
demonstrated, this will only be possible if solidarity is found at all different levels 
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within society, including the supranational institutions, the intergovernmental member 
states and the European residents.  
 According to the research, the main reason the refugee crisis erupted to such a 
severe extent was due to a lack of instrumental solidarity. The member states lost the 
means of how solidarity would both benefit their own nation and the EU. They were 
mostly focused on applying intergovernmental approaches during the crisis that 
would maintain peace and stability in their own nation. The lack of normative 
solidarity was considered to be less of a problem. This thesis nevertheless disagrees 
with this and argues how the default of the EU asylum regulations was not only due to 
unfair burden and the lack of proper governance. The main reason for this division 
was due to a difference in history and culture. The different EU member states did not 
share the same norms and values that resulted in an uneven approach towards the 
asylum seekers. Therefore, the creation of a European identity is vital in order for the 
member states to be able to cooperate better in the future. This will only be created 
when there is an increase of normative solidarity found among the member sates.  
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Appendix 
 
Transcript of interviews  
 
1. Interviewee: Rhodia Maas  
Interviewer: Madelon Jansen van Rosendaal  
Date: 06/05/2018 
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands  
 
1. What was the position of the Netherlands towards the process of resolving the 
refugee crisis? 
 
Initially, the focus of the Netherlands was to make sure that nobody would end up on 
the street. During the first few months their primary focus was towards providing 
everyone shelter. In the meantime, meetings in Brussel were held because it had 
already become a European problem and how to deal with this situation. Everyone 
had already seen that this was a complicated problem that the EU had to deal with. 
Initially, everyone focused on the Dublin regulations and its applicability during the 
crisis. Pretty soon, even before the crisis had become a big issue, the court had ruled 
that return to Greece would not be possible. Later on in the process, return to Italy 
was also ruled out, especially for families. One could also notice that Germany was so 
flooded with refugees that it was not able to deal with all the Dublin claims. Initially, 
the focus was really on attempting to make sure that the Dublin regulation would 
endure. In the meantime, negotiations were held about how we were going to make 
sure that people would not approach our country and attempt to enter it. Even though 
we did initially have a feeling similar to Germany, in the sense that we felt that we 
could accept all incoming refugees. We wanted to sympathize with what was 
happening. But the incoming streams of refugees was becoming so big that countries 
were starting to realize that this no longer could go on. Everyone realized that Dublin 
regulation should tried to be complied. Everyone also realized that something had to 
be done regarding the distribution of the refugees among different member states in 
Europe. Het also soon became clear that if someone asked for a residence permit in 
Hungary, they would still move to another country more towards the Western part of 
Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany). And that in the meanwhile people 
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had to really focus on how to make sure that these large incoming flows of refugees 
would not all come to Western Europe (and the Netherlands). It also became more 
clear that in this large incoming flow of refugees, many of these people would not be 
eligible for a status. And that eventually, especially in the burden-sharing mechanism 
(spreading people around Europe), one realized that when you decide to make the 
selection at the boarders of Europe, when you decide who can and who can’t enter 
Europe, and from this point you can also already start working with integration in one 
of the EU member states where you say okay you now get a ticket to for example 
Finland where the spreading of the refugees can start.  
 
2. Does the Dutch government think that more political integration is needed at 
EU level to deal effectively with refugee crises? 
 
Yes, absolutely. The Netherlands could have never resolved the crisis by themselves. 
Especially because it also involved negotiation strategies with the countries of origin. 
It was of course a EU problem. Sometimes one can still notice that one country 
suddenly has to deal with many applications but this was an EU wide problem. This 
was discussed in Brussel and it really became a Brussel’s thing.  
 
3. Do you think that the existing EU policies vis-à-vis refugees provide a 
sufficient framework to deal with potential refugee crises in the future? 
 
No. The refugee convention should be adjusted enormously. The refugee convention 
has nothing to do anymore with the current problems. It was created in a period of 
time that was mainly looking at flows from Western Europe it self. At that time there 
was much less mobility. This was still seen during the endings of the 90’s., during the 
wars in Yugoslavia where large amount of people from Kosovo or from Bosnia came 
this way (to Western Europe). However, once peace had returned to their country. 
They eventually would return back to their country of origin. However what one can 
see now is that the Refugee convention is being used for completely different 
purposes, namely for work, fleeing poverty, fleeing drought, many other different 
problems, where the refugee convention has made the rules to such an extent that you 
cannot finish these handlings practical, seeing as everyone has the right that their 
application will be taken into consideration. We now also have a larger legal act, with 
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objection and appeal, and the European Court and all the other institutions. Europe is 
not able to handle it like this because the refugee convention was never written for 
situations like these. According to me the Refugee treaty has to bee adjusted. Apart 
from that, but that is more towards my section, I believe one has to focus more on 
‘forced return’. I believe we should make more agreements and treaties with the 
countries of origin, however this will also have to be done within an EU context, 
because you will need the pressure to not provide certain countries with certain 
facilities the moment they do not want to cooperate with forced return. And I strongly 
believe that when you make the selection either in the Netherlands or outside the 
European borders, most preferably outside the European borders, before having the 
people come here. This saves the refugees from a lot of trouble and suffering, a lot of 
deaths in the Mediterranean sea, it also saves a lot of years from your life when one 
has to leave the EU after all. It will also be a lot easier to spread the people across 
Europe when the selection is made beforehand outside the borders of the EU. It will 
also be easier to provide those people who are really in need of shelter, who are really 
in danger and to the remaining we can say sorry but we will not be able to help you in 
Europe, you should stay in your country of origin. Yes indeed it is hard in Nigeria and 
it is a lot less comfortable than here, but that is the case for about three quarter of the 
world. And if you want to resolve this issue you will need different and new 
regulations. The refugee convention will never be able to solve issues such as these. 
Also for example, what is important to discuss is the Dublin regulation. The 
Netherlands for example does not have that many Dublin claims. They especially 
have claims out. The chances of arriving via Schiphol here and then travelling 
forward to Germany are very small. It is especially the claim out. This has the DTNV 
and the IND fully done from the beginning. However it was soon noticed that this was 
hard to comply, seeing as one has to find out where the refugee comes from and this 
can be rather complicated. In principle, you would hardly have to deal with anyone in 
the Netherlands, only if he or she has entered via the external border.  Therefore the 
main focus was to deal efficiently will all the asylum applications. Initially, also to 
proceed the cases which were really of vital importance. If someone was from Syria, 
he would immediately be given a permit. The whole Dublin mechanism works two 
ways. Namely, if you’re Italy or Greece, you have a massive large incoming flow 
where all of Europe could claim that they all have to return back to you. For countries 
such as the Netherlands, there is hardly any inflow. Only that that arrives at Schiphol 
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and some via the harbor of Rotterdam. This also demonstrates how the existing EU 
policies really should be amended. They are outdated and are unfair.  
4. Do you think that the refugee crisis has damaged the process of EU 
integration? If so, why? 
 
I think so yes. One can still notice the effects of the crisis. You can see, especially 
Eastern European countries and the position they adopted during the crisis towards 
solidarity within the EU, and Hungary who are still very right in their government, 
they really wanted different things. I think this can partly be linked with the crisis, and 
by the crisis I mean the economic crisis, but that also the refugee crisis has 
demonstrated a fundamental difference between certain EU countries which made it 
harder to further stimulate the process of integration in the EU. Western en eastern 
Europe and north and south.  
 
5. To what extent did the EU have influence on the return proceedings of the 
refugees within the Netherlands? 
 
The EU has an increasing influence on the return proceedings. You have something 
that is called ‘the return directive’. This makes the return proceedings a lot more 
complicated, especially forced return. This is because the criteria, for example 
previously Dublin claimants would be kept in refugee detention before they would be 
forced to move to a different EU country. This was done because out of experience 
we would know that people who were already asylum hopping, the moment you say 
hey were going to have to deport you they were like okay well ill go somewhere else 
then. But for example the ‘return directive’ a couple of years ago has eliminated that 
whole mechanism and has forbidden it. This means that for the return proceedings, 
had you been in Germany, and had you applied for asylum there and you’re coming to 
the Netherlands and the Netherlands notices that you have already applied for asylum 
somewhere else in Europe  before, the application will not be processed. The asylum 
seeker will be turned down due to inadmissibility and he will be fored to return back 
to Germany. In the past, the situation would be that when someone is forced to leave 
the country, they will be given 28 days to leave. If someone has not left within those 
28 days, the Dublin claimant would then be arrested and would then be placed in 
custody for 2 days and would then be transported to Germany. At some point 
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however, the EU has forbidden this return directive and claimed that Dublin claimants 
have the right to be warned several days in advance when they will be deported. Yes, 
the moment you apply this regulation the Dublin claimant will get his suitcase and 
leave. Of course this makes sense, if you get told that you will be deported on may the 
13th, the moment the government arrives that that persons door no one will be there 
obviously since that person will have fled. In issues like this the return directive has 
had a lot of impact. The efficiency of the return directive in the Netherlands has 
however had a lot of help from organizations such as Frontex. In this sense there was 
European influence. There was a certain degree of European process of expansion and 
this has mostly only increased throughout the years. There is a network of European 
countries who collectively try to put pressure on other European countries to 
cooperate with the forced return proceedings. An example of this is the Urint network 
in which also experiences are exchanged but for example for the Netherlands the 
situation applied that it had hardly any contact with Mongolia for example. The 
Germans did and the Germans introduced us to Mongolia and since then the forced 
return proceedings have gone much better towards Mongolia. So networks are 
important and they go together with the EU. It makes a country stronger and it makes 
the practical situation so much easier. Also a network of European member states, not 
everyone involves in this and cooperates but for example to reassure that the return 
proceedings will improve, it is important to increase this in a European manner.  
 
 
2. Interviewee: Bart-Jan ter Heerdt 
Interviewer: Madelon Jansen van Rosendaal 
Date: 17/05/2018 
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands  
 
1. What was the position of the Netherlands towards the process of resolving the 
refugee crisis? 
 
The Netherlands can be seen as pro-Europe. During the migration crisis this was their 
starting point. At the same time, Klaas dijkhof was represent back then, and he really 
thought that the Netherlands had to do what they had to do. This was their starting 
point, we just have to get going with it. Very soon we found out that other countries 
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dealt different with the situation than we did. Moreover, countries such as Hungary 
did not accept anyone and sent them through to other countries and that Italy did not 
want to work with finger prints, they did not register the refugees. So rather soon the 
Netherlands decided that we should cooperate in these times of crisis but we do have 
to find a way to not make our country too attractive. This did however take some 
time. In the beginning that notion was not really there, but soon they realized that 
other countries were not as easy as the Netherlands was. Klaas Dijkhof did not want 
to be that strict, he believed that we had to do what we could do, however within 
certain regulations. The Netherlands also focused on what are we doing ‘more’ than 
what is needed on the ground of European rules. Look at that. You could also see 
within the cabinet, and this is what made it really hard, that PVDA and VVD were 
together, within the VVD you also have two different kinds. You have the liberals 
who claim that we should follow the law but with minimizing, but you also had die 
hard VVDers who said minimalizing? We’re going to do less than minimalizing. Stef 
Block did in the newspaper that they’re coming to the Netherlands to get breast 
augmentation and dental protection. While the PVDA on the other hand said no we 
are going to help everyone!!! This demonstrates that it is hard to say and clarify what 
the position of the Netherlands was towards the refugee crisis because within the 
cabinet itself there was a division about what position the Netherlands should take. 
But in the end our goal however was to adhere to the treaty and to the European laws. 
We are not going to position ourselves under it. In that sense, whatever the other 
countries decide to do, this will be and stay our goal and soon enough we noticed that 
there were other ‘like-minded’ countries surrounding us who had the same visions 
and goals. North – west Europe, with whom we also had consultations and meetings 
about what we are now going to do in order to find each other. At some point there 
was a twofold in Europe with a group that had the same position as the Netherlands 
and a group with countries more on the periphery who had a different position.  
 
2. Does the Dutch government think that more political integration is needed at 
EU level to deal effectively with refugee crises? 
 
Yes, absolutely. I can say this with 100 percent certainty. It is also mentioned rather 
clear in the coalition agreement. We really think that we as Europe should strengthen 
ourselves. This could also mean that on some parts you will be worse off, that certain 
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arrangements will be made and set which we would rather not have. But we are 
willing to accept this within limits. You can notice this at the moment. There are now 
very much negotiations about the Common European Asylum Policy. But there is a 
clear limit for us.  So it shouldn’t go too crazy. But we are very much in favor for 
having the same asylum application process in the whole of Europe and that it would 
have the same outcome. And we are also very much in favor for having the same level 
of facilities throughout Europe. The quality of the reception and access to the labor 
market for example, there is a large difference between the different countries on 
these two aspects. When do you get access to the job market and how much money do 
you get given? So we are very supportive of that becoming more unified. And we the 
Netherlands are willing to compromise on certain parts but within limits. The goal of 
this cabinet is still the only way to survive this is by handling it in a European way, 
Europeanize. It. Because if not each country just keeps on doing what they want 
themselves..    
 
3. Do you think that the existing EU policies vis-à-vis refugees provide a 
sufficient framework to deal with potential refugee crises in the future? 
 
No. Not at the moment. Regarding the content processing and handling of asylum 
cases, one can notice big differences, which is weird. So what we now have tried, for 
which the Netherlands was a great advocate, we now have the European asylum 
agency which is located in Malta, we have asked to develop country policy of 
Afghanistan, so we have the Dutch country policy of Afghanistan, in which we state 
for example that single women in Afghanistan belong to a risk group. We will focus 
on this group in a what more benevolent way than when focusing on young men for 
example. Journalists also belong to a risk group. This is what we have in the 
Netherlands, but we actually think that this kind of policy should be introduced in all 
countries and should be the same everywhere. So what we asked to the European 
Asylum Agency is go focus and work on a group with all member states. A colleague 
of us did this and it took them 2 years. They will present this report in July, however 
this report will be based on information of 2 years ago… so I think and Holland 
thinks that we should do this, but if you see how much time it takes for all member 
states to agree on something like this, this will be a hard job!! But it will be nice than 
when someone from Afghanistan or Eritrea or Syria asks for asylum in Germany with 
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your story, that the result will be exact same as when you for example will ask for 
asylum in Hungary. So we do want to invest in projects like these, but at the same 
time we do know it will be very hard. Regarding the level of provision we should also 
try to create the same. The quality of reception in Greece has to improve. The level of 
reception in Hungary has to improve. At the same time we do know it will be very 
hard to achieve this. And everyone should feel the same responsibility. The Italians 
have to register the incoming people. The Hungarians shouldn’t make the reception 
unattractive that they’re actually pushing people away. The Hungarians detain 
everyone and then say no that’s not true you have to leave. At the east side you should 
leave. And what really has been a large bottleneck is the Dublin story. Our secretary 
of State also gave an interview about this in which he mentions that he wants different 
agreements. Now we have said that you have to return to the country where you 
register first. He wants that you return to the country where you have travelled to. 
That is for Holland a very good deal. Because nearly no one travels over sea and 
hardly no one enters via Schiphol. They all come via Germany or Belgium, but when 
he proposed this the Belgian secretary of state said well we think this is a good idea. 
But yeah this seems logic because for him it’s the same story, they come from 
Luxembourg, Germany or France. So now its waiting for the French, the German and 
the Luxembourg people to say it’s a good idea and then eventually you will have the 
problem lying at the Italians, and if we solve the problem with this we don’t know. 
The effect then will be yeah you can say you travelled through/via Italy so we can 
send you back to Italy. But yeah I just told you about the quality of the reception in 
Italy, that wont become better.  We still think that we should invest in Europe and that 
it will be only way. And what also plays a large role is the return. And then especially 
forced return. In Our policy now forced return is often not possible. Many countries, 
when people do not have travel documents the countries we don’t want you back, and 
then we have a Moroccan who we want to send back but then Morocco says yes but 
this one is not ours. We do not want it back we do not provide travel documents for 
this person. I believe that you can only solve this via a European way. If we as the 
Netherlands stay individual in this, we are only a small country, we think that we have 
to make it European the return proceedings. If countries say we don’t take back 
people, okay fine but then your ministers and their spouses no shopping visa for 
London and Paris. I really think this will help. We have to be stronger in this.  
	   	   	  	  	  Jansen	  van	  Rosendaal	  s1402900	  
	   55	  
Coming back to your question whether the existing EU refugee policies function 
properly, I would like to add that I can say this with 100 percent certainty that more 
integration is needed. The Dutch government has also mentioned this rather clear in 
the coalition agreement. We really think that we as Europe should strengthen 
ourselves. This could also mean that on some parts you will be worse off, that certain 
arrangements will be made and set which we would rather not have. But we are 
willing to accept this within limits. You can notice this at the moment. There are now 
very much negotiations about the Common European Asylum Policy. But there is a 
clear limit for us.  So it shouldn’t go too crazy. But we are very much in favor for 
having the same asylum application process in the whole of Europe and that it would 
have the same outcome. And we are also very much in favor for having the same level 
of facilities throughout Europe. The quality of the reception and access to the labor 
market for example, there is a large difference between the different countries on 
these two aspects. When do you get access to the job market and how much money do 
you get given? So we are very supportive of that becoming more unified. And we the 
Netherlands are willing to compromise on certain parts but within limits. The goal of 
this cabinet is still the only way to survive this is by handling it in a European way, 
Europeanize. It. Because if not each country just keeps on doing what they want 
themselves..    
 
4. Do you think that the refugee crisis has damaged the process of EU 
integration? If so, why? 
 
Brexit has to do something with this. It definitely has put more pressure on it. I 
already notice it here with my colleagues. Many people were always very pro Europe, 
and now you notice that people say I don’t really know. People have become more 
suspicious. I don’t think it has benefitted the European case.. the ratio north south 
against east west. It has definitely not benefitted it! It was definitely a test. Look 
Europe is beautiful when it goes well, but now you see that when there is pressure, the 
solidarity is quite hard to find. My colleague is working on effective solidarity. The 
idea at one point of the European commission was okay, there are apparently 
countries who do not want to receive too many refugees. Then they have to do 
something else. Each refugee that you decide not to take in, you have to pay 250,000 
euro. This money can then be used in other member states to support and fund the 
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shelter of the refugees. Or if Hungary do not want to know anything about the 
refugees but you do enjoy guarding your boarders, then you must provide additional 
capacities in the Mediterranean Sea. But this is of course very hard. You have to 
compare apples with pears. But there are people in Europe who truly believe in this 
concept. They think we can invent a model where under at the stripe everyone does 
their fair share. It would be beautiful but I’m afraid it is too hard.  
 
5. To what extent did the EU have influence on the return proceedings of the 
refugees within the Netherlands? 
 
Well, first of all the whole return proceedings policies framed within European law. 
The Netherlands did practice this on their own national way. The return and departure 
service did work together sometimes with other EU member states, but that was more 
about the good relationships between the DT&V, than that that happened on European 
level. What did happen, when the Netherlands was chairman, we did talk about pilot 
to work together with 3 countries in the section of departure. This was however a lot 
of hassle, because the problems differed between each country, a problem for one 
country was not a problem for the other country. There have been three countries 
which decided to work together on European level, but I do not even remember what 
countries that were so that says a lot about the efficiency of this project. I don’t think 
it really came alive but it was the goal.  
 
3. Interviewee: Peter Diez 
Interviewer: Madelon Jansen van Rosendaal 
Date: 06-06-2018 
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands 
 
1. What was the position of the Netherlands towards the process of resolving the 
refugee crisis? 
 
What was the crisis? Why did we have it? Why couldn’t Europe deal with all the 
people entering? It is weird that they couldn’t deal with it because we have 
agreements on what to do when 1 person arrives, or 10 people. We do not have 
agreement on quantity but we do have agreements on quality. So when people cross 
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the external border of the union, and say hello I am here because I am seeking 
asylum, then it is completely normal that you will be registered as asylum seeker. 
That you will be taken care of there. That is the logic, the agreements that we have 
made. But thereafter, I have questioned myself, what if I position myself in the 
position of the country such as Italy or Greece, and 10,0000 people arrive here per 
week, 60,000. Do we have the capacities and the manpower to deal with this? Within 
no time the refugee camps explode because they cant deal with the amount of people 
arriving. Then you will have inhumane conditions if you cannot deal with all that. So 
then they will be sent to the mainland to be taken care of there. But mainland? 
Mainland is not a prison, and a reception center is also not a prison, so before you 
know those people will be arriving in the Netherlands two weeks later. Or Sweden or 
wherever. But it begins at the beginning, and that is registration, you have to register 
all the people! it is one of the fundamental and basic things in the refugee policy in 
the union, it also has to do with safety, but you want to know who enters your 
country. Who enters Europe? Actually the intention is to then already divide the good 
people from the bad. That you can see hey sorry you’re coming from Tunisia, you say 
you’re from Syria but I can tell that you’re from Tunisia. Those things happen. I 
found an identity card on one of the Greek islands from a Moroccan. Large quantities 
require preparedness, early warning mechanisms, and massive help. Because that you 
cant deal with it by yourself being Greece and Italy, yes I understand that, but we also 
have agreements about this in Europe! Go, via Frontex missions, via asylum support 
teams of EASO, go help! But it starts with a country’s own responsibility, to secure 
its external borders, and everything that has to do with that, so also an asylum 
application. If you’re responsible and you realize you can’t deal with it, you yourself 
have to ask for help, because we are not an occupying power, the other countries, you 
have to be willing to accept this help. So, you see during the refugee crisis a very 
good mismatch between what is said and organized on paper, and it also requires 
organization skills from a country itself to feel its responsibilities and to come up with 
a help question on time so that other countries can help on time. And because all of 
this was not right at that time, images of 1000 of people walking on high ways 
because they themselves thought well nice that I’ve been accepted into Italy now but 
actually my goal is to go to such and such. What also didn’t help in that period is that 
Germany said at one point, we don’t send Syrians back to the country of first entry, 
the Dublin regulation. Everyone thinks that Dublin means that you have to be taken 
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care of in the country where you first enter, yes in the list of rules is it the last one. By 
default the member state where you first entered the union is responsible, but there are 
other rules who have a larger priority, if you enter Greece via turkey, and you have a 
passport with a visa which is given by a Dutch embassy, then that means that the 
Netherlands is responsible, not Greece, if there are family members of a family then 
that is. There are so many rules and only when none of these rules apply, then you 
arrive at the last one and yes then Greece is responsible. And there are people ho say 
yes but that is unfair, because if I understood correctly, that default rule, you present it 
nice Peter, but that is the main rule, if you look at the quantity, the amount of people, 
that would mean that the outer shell of the European Union, that is where it should all 
happen, they are responsible, and the others, two things, 1. If, I think it influences the 
behavior of future migrants, if they know that it is not up to them to chose where but 
that, that they will be processed there where they, and of course, Europe is not a 
prison, you can go where you want to, but you will be sent back by the law to Italy, 
you will be sent back by the Dutch to Greece, then it might have a filtering effect on 
the decision of the people who still want to go, and then I don’t mean the people who 
are in real danger and fear because for them it shouldn’t matter, you’re happy that you 
are safe, but for the people who think it is a lottery and why don’t I just try, who 
knows I might have a golden future in Sweden. So that is one. If the system would 
work as it works, it has a filtering effect. And you cannot tell me that if the situation 
would be that that eventually means that the people who can stay, because for the 
processing you will get help, but if that would mean that the people who can stay will 
cause a disproportionate heavy pressure on the entire shell, from Lisbon till Riga, then 
don’t tell me that we cannot make agreements and deals about this in Europe to 
distribute it more fairly. But that is again paper reality that yes, if we look at the rules 
then the outer shell they all have to solve it, okay with help from others, both at the 
border surveillance as in the asylum procedure, but how many people do not slip 
through the loopholes, or the cracks of the laws and controls, because there is no 
fence in the sea, you can easily go by boat and arrive somewhere in the night on an 
Italian beach, no one will see you, you are not noticed by the Coast Guard, or via the 
green border, Greece Bulgaria there that corner, that you still manage to secretly 
enter, and yes people who enter secretly. And who then signs up as asylum seeker in 
the Netherlands in the asylum center, that person is not registered anywhere, and if 
you’re not registered, then who is responsible? Yes then The Netherlands is 
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responsible, so you will still always.. so my position and meaning is that had we not 
had Dublin, then we Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, would have had many more 
asylum seekers than we had now. So is it actually the other way around. So where 
countries as Italy and Greece say well the Dublin regulations, have you read them 
properly? But if we take that literally then we will always be the ones fooled, but then 
I would turn it around and say no but look at the reality, what are because if you guys 
are right, then you will be left with all the asylum seekers, and where are all the 
asylum seekers in Europe? Where are most of them? Are they in Greece and Italy? 
Now, since the crisis, then there was a positive spin off, you can notice that the 
asylum numbers in Greece and Italy finally seem to get a size that one can say well 
now I understand, because now, these are numbers, large numbers, but Germany also 
has these, and Sweden also has these, and the Netherlands also has these, and on the 
one side it is nice that we have rules to determine who is responsible, but then I will 
invite you to take a close look and see well how exactly does it work with the asylum 
seeker who has been reported in the Netherlands (who has applied in the Netherlands) 
and we check Eurodac and think well this is a hit! Italy is responsible.  And that you 
then go and take a look and think okay, this reminds me of a book of the DT&V – 
then why don’t you just send them back? Then why don’t you just send them to the 
country that is responsible? Well no but wait a minute, the person concerned can go to 
the court and say that he does not agree, no because in his case he cant go to Italy and 
then we have to take it back to court and the court has to make a decision and so if 
you see how many claims we have on a country and how many percent of these 
claims we actually really make work effectively and send the person concerned back 
to the country of first enter, then you will be amazed. A large percent of the people 
disappears. Rather do I disappear in the illegality, not necessarily in the Netherlands 
because we do not know that, they are just not there anymore, it was the hour to take 
the person concerned in a bus well yes gone. Where they are, nobody knows. But they 
will appear somewhere again and we think who are you actually? That could also be 
in Letland, like who are you actually? No papers, well then we have to go check 
Eurodac, and then..  
I: But it happens right,  that they get sent back? 
Then they will be sent back to Italy. Cos that that is the only because Eurodac will 
then say Italy, but then Latvia has to inform Italy and say hey we have someone here 
and he is registered in your country as asylum seekers and as illegal border crosser, 
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and ten Italy first has to agree with this about the transmission, there are deadlines for 
that, many times Italy just ignores the deadlines and makes them expire, and that 
means tacit agreement and consent, but yes this will take another 3 months, so it’s 
complicated.  
 
2. Does the Dutch government think that more political integration is needed at 
EU level to deal effectively with refugee crises? 
 
I don’t really know what you mean by more political integration. If you understand 
under this more powers for Brussels, then I don’t know if this will be the solution for 
the problem. The problem is that in the treaty is states that we have a common asylum 
policy as a Union. And if you look at how member states perform and present 
themselves in the council, then you must really ask yourself sorry but what do you 
understand under a common asylum policy? If you say these kind of things. So yes 
there is a lack of political unanimity in the field of the migration file in Europe. But 
yes everyone can see this. If you read the newspapers that you know ooh but at the 
same time I say yes but wait a minute, is that so weird? Yes if you look at it from a 
juridical point of view then yes it is weird hey we have a treaty? All these heads of 
state have signed it, and it made official and there have been made parliaments, how 
come that we have such a large problem with this? And then you see three interest 
groups in Europe. You have the countries who think they have a problem with illegal 
immigration, they do not have a problem with asylum, they have a problem with 
illegal immigration, there are countries who traditionally take in many asylum 
seekers, the countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Austria.. they do not 
have a problem with illegal immigration, they have a problem with asylum! Then 
there are countries, Portugal, Baltic countries, Hungary, Poland, they think this is 
hard, all these people with weird colors, because we hardly have any of those in our 
own countries, and actually we want to keep it that way, now I mentioned a few 
countries but not all think like this, but lets put it this way, there are a few who 
express themselves like that, who really talk about the homogeneity of their society. 
They talk about but wait a minute sorry are we not allowed to decide this ourselves? 
Can we ourselves decide how we want our society to look? We are not going to let 
Brussels tell us how to make up our own society! Brussels,, European Union. Well, 
that problem of asylum and illegal immigration is the same problem. The illegal 
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immigrant today in Sicily, will be the asylum seekers tomorrow in the Netherlands or 
Germany or wherever. So we should stop pretending that those two things are 
different separate problems. It is one and the same problem! Or phenomenon! What 
manifests differently. Cos you know, if you as an illegal immigrant arrive in Spain 
and you can enter the black market there and work there, without problems and that 
you can just because there is demand for in south Europe for labor and manpower, 
legal, illegal, well whatever, a piece of paper, don’t make such a fuss of it. So you 
know they do not have such a big issue with asylum because those people do not have 
to ask for asylum there, they can just work there, yes in Greece that is different so 
okay. But the big problem is, because if you say okay south and north west Europe 
they will see that this is one and the same problem which we have to solve together, 
and that are we doing in practice, but there are a few east European countries who that 
with this background, where if you think about it any longer, and you try to position 
yourself in their position you can think well this is bad, then you will understand 
better what their problem is, but if you understand their problem better, you can better 
think of solutions. So have we proposed them. We said okay well if it is a problem for 
you to receive people of which you know those are real refugees, so they will stay, to 
then still share the burdens of this whole puzzle, can we then not decide that you will 
receive people of which we beforehand know and that it is clear that they will have a 
very low chance for asylum. So that you guys are responsible for making sure those 
people return to the country of origin. Then you have spread out the pain of that area. 
There are more solutions! What I want to add is that during the crisis I think that both 
the Netherlands and the EU looked both wanted to work together. We have worked 
very hard on European solutions, also I have to say, we would have become chairman 
of the degree of the union on 1 January 2016, right in the middle of the crisis, and 
there have been many moments during the end of 2015 where we thought okay, a 
chairman is already pretty tough, but a chairman in combination of a crisis, well how 
are we going to handle this? So we have really, you can always notice when its your 
turn, half a year you will be chairman of the council of ministers, but that already 
stars with most certain half a year before, in the sense that well yes we are going 
down a peg, we are going to try to achieve our own national policies a little less, 
because yes we have to prepare ourselves for the role of honors broker as chairman. 
But I am sure, also when we would not have had that chairman position, we would 
always have looked very much for a European solution. And which we have 
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eventually also have found! So that is for the European side. Did we look for national 
solutions? Of course we looked for national solutions! For things that we ourselves 
are being faced with. We ourselves have to organize shelter for the immigrants, we 
ourselves had to organize it. The normal shelter was full well then we have to create 
emergency shelter but at a certain point those were also full so then we have to create 
crisis reception centers. And those were at some point also full! So at one point we 
had to put people into busses and said to the bus driver go and drive, yes but where 
to? Yes I don’t know but just start driving and I hope I will be able to tell you in a 
couple of hours where you can bring these people. This is how bizarre the conditions 
were! And still were we able in this period every day to realize, and we would never 
know this at the beginning and start of the day, but at the end of the day we could 
every time say we again managed to provide everyone a bed! For those kind of things 
it really is your own responsibility, you as a country have to organize and provide the 
shelter.  
 
3. Do you think that the existing EU policies vis-à-vis refugees provide a 
sufficient framework to deal with potential refugee crises in the future? 
 
No not yet, but there are many proposals of the commission that do aim to be future 
crisis proof. But these proposals do have to be accepted by the council and by the 
European parliament. But with the current legislation you can come a long way, but in 
particular that distribution issue is still a problem.  
 
4. Do you think that the refugee crisis has damaged the process of EU 
integration? If so, why? 
 
I do not think it had a positive effect, no.nI really believe, back in the days, before 
2004, we also had these problems. 2004 was the year wherein the last 10 member 
states joined the European union. Political not correct to speak of the former Eastern 
Bloc countries, and I still see people writing this down and then I think guys from 
which time frame do you guys come from? That is a massive shame these days! But 
when the European Union only had 15 member states, and you only had the 
opposition between north and south, we already had this problem!! We had the war on 
the Balkan in the 1990s, people killing each other in Yugoslavia, large refugee flows, 
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so yes we’ve been there! So you can say hey what have we learnt from the problems 
of the 1990s? Because yes no one can predict the future but something like that can 
happen again. Thankfully not because of a war in Europe itself, but because of a war 
close to Europe! Bordering Europe! Syria is very close! If you look on the map how 
close Syria is from Cyprus, then you think ooh you can almost row your boat there to 
get from one place to another! So you know back then it was Yugoslaiva, now it is 
Syria, what will it be next? But that something like this will repeat itself, look at the 
demographic development in Africa, look at how the population structure is there, 
look at water shortage, look at the ground reasons for migration, try to predict what 
that means for a continent like Africa in the coming decennia, well I have seen 
predictions that I think we haven’t seen anything yet, and we are going to laugh about 
the crisis in 2015/2016. Remember? 2015/2016? We called that a crisis! We called 
that a crisis! We were so naïve! Yes.  
 
5. To what extent did the EU have influence on the return proceedings of the 
refugees within the Netherlands? 
 
No that much. Look there is a return guideline. So yeah if you say what is the 
influence of the EU, oh wait a minute, you can interpret the question in two different 
ways, one is juridical, what is the effect, well there is a return guideline so there is 
legislation in Europe that discuss the return proceedings. That is good. But it is also 
an obstacle in some areas. Some things we cannot do, but what we would really like 
to do, but the return guidelines create an obstacle for this. And well to get the 
commission in state to change the legislation and little legislation has been made in 
the area of asylum and migration that was so sensitive for the European parliament as 
the Return Directive was. That only the memory alone makes that the commission is 
very reluctant to come up with a proposal to adjust it because then we will open 
Pandora’s box and we will get a large argument with the European Parliament. That is 
juridical. From a political perspective – I think that the European Union, we could 
have a lot more leverage as the European union if the European Union will bring us in 
contact with third world countries. Belgium once had a problem with Russia. The 
Russians refused to take back illegal Russians, a lot was invested in this. It didn’t 
work. At some point the Belgians were really done with it! They said okay then we 
now are going to play a different game. We are closing the consulates in Moscow and 
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St Petersburg. No visa will be given to Russians anymore!! Then you think obviously, 
then you can just ask a visa for Holland,, yes but then you do have to travel a different 
way! or then you ask a visa for Paris? Yes but then you have to travel via Paris and 
this is a lot of hassle. En these meetings are in Brussels! Russians have to go to 
Brussels for meetings! That lasted 3 weeks and then Russia said okay then… and then 
they managed to work together! With this example I try to demonstrate that if the 
small Belgium manages to convince big Russia, how is it possible that the big 
European Union does not manage to realize something like this in relationship with 
Ghana? Just to mention a example. I understand it becomes sensitive when I give 
other examples, European union china. But we have so many practical return 
problems with countries of which we think yes sorry we are not taken seriously 
apparently as union? And the Netherlands can say hello Ankara is someone home we 
want to talk, ooh not interested. And we have even made them feel during the 
development cooperation with Ghana like okay well then you will receive 10 million 
less development aid. Well it did not help! Nothing! But this is the Netherlands in 
relationship to Ghana but how would it be if the European union as a whole in 
relationship with Ghana, what will happen then? Or the European union as a whole 
and Somalia? And I can name many more examples! I really think that the European 
union can achieve more and you touch a different subject this is nexus between 
migration policy and foreign policy. You have to use your foreign policy to realize 
and achieve things on the migration policy in contact with third world countries. you 
need this for return proceedings. But as long as we do not have a good return policy 
and good working relationships with third world countries about returning, then you 
end up with many people who are justly asking for protection but you also end up 
with a lot of people of which everyone thinks they should return to their country of 
origin! But they won’t return! You can’t get them tog o back. And the longer it takes 
the more the roots of these people end up in the ground and they get children who do 
not know their country of origin and do not speak the language of the country of 
origin and get a passport of the new country.  
 
